


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94th Congress }
2d Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT



REPORT OF A VISIT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSWOMEN
TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
DECEMBER 30, 1975-JANUARY 9, 1976

PURSUANT TO

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AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
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(II)

FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., December 22, 1976.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on International Relations by one of its members, the Honorable Helen S. Meyner, who accompanied the special delegation of women Members of Congress to the People's Republic of China, headed by the Honorable Margaret M. Heckler. The Congresswomen, accompanied by Dr. Joyce Kallgren, visited the People's Republic of China by special invitation of then Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and the trip was designated an official diplomatic mission by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger.

The observations and findings in this report are those of the delegation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on International Relations.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

DECEMBER 22, 1976.

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am herewith transmitting a report on the China trip taken by the women Members of Congress during the last Christmas recess.

We believe that the report may be of use to the members of the International Relations Committee and of the House and Senate as a whole.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

HELEN MEYNER.

(v)

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INTRODUCTION

This is a report of the congressional factfinding mission to the People's Republic of China, December 30, 1975-January 9, 1976. The members of the delegation were Representatives Margaret M. Heckler (chairperson), Patsy T. Mink (deputy chairperson), Bella S. Abzug, Yvonne B. Burke, Elizabeth Holtzman, Patricia Schroeder, Corinne C. Boggs, Cardiss Collins, Millicent Fenwick, Helen S. Meyner, and Gladys Noon Spellman. Prof. Joyce K. Kallgren served as administrator of the group. Dr. Freeman H. Carey was physician for the group. Others were Mr. John Mink, Mr. Martin Abzug, Mr. William Burke, Mrs. Filia Holtzman, Mr. James Schroeder, Hon. Robert Meyner, Mr. Reuben Spellman, Miss Belinda Heckler, Mr. Kevin Collins, Mr. Hale Boggs III, and Mrs. Sara Cary. An independent television crew was invited by the Chinese to accompany the delegation and did so. They were Mr. Thomas Fleming, Ms. Lynn Joiner, and Mr. James Arnold.

Our delegation was the first group of congressional representatives to visit China after the trip of President Ford, December 2-5, and, as events have shown, the last to meet with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Furthermore, the final day of our trip coincided with the announcement of the death of Premier Chou En-lai. A major purpose of our trip was to understand better the significant problems both internal and international that the Chinese believe they confront, to appraise the methods which the Chinese have adopted for solving their problems and their likelihood of success, and to observe for ourselves the links between domestic concerns and foreign policy intentions of the Chinese leadership. Through a realistic understanding of the priorities and leadership capabilities of the Chinese together with an estimation of their success, the United States will be in a position to make more accurate assessments of Chinese nation-state realities and hence of our own foreign policy options.

Each member of the delegation reached individual conclusions with respect to major topics, both domestic and foreign. All of us have been making and will continue to make separate judgments and policy recommendations where appropriate. The trip, although brief, was intense in its effect. Each Congresswoman brought individual interests, assumptions, experiences, and expertise to a country that most had not visited before. Circumstances limited our ability to see much of such a highly diverse and varied nation, but our experience was sufficient to make us realize the very considerable diversity in customs, habits, style, and perhaps goals that characterize the People's Republic of China. The purpose of this report is to present some of our observations on a range of issues so that the recommendations and decisions of the Congress will be based upon as much data as possible.

Certain observations of the group were common. Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States are important

and likely to increase in importance. Both the Chinese and the members of the delegation recognize that there are important differences between our two social systems. Progress in changing our relations may be slow not only because of the differences but also because of external foreign policy considerations. The Chinese are realistic about these differences, and, for the moment, willing to wait, though they will obviously continue to present their views and desires forcefully.

A visit to China offers the guest the opportunity to alter and adjust expectations. It is therefore of great importance to do all we can to enhance the degree of interchange between the peoples of our two countries. Just as American visitors to China have the opportunity to speak at length with their Chinese hosts about matters of concern, affording the opportunity to correct misapprehensions about intent and capabilities, so, too, the interchange may serve to correct or alter perceptions by the Chinese. In addition to the modest program of formal exchanges of scientists and doctors presently arranged through the National Academy of Sciences, together with informal trips of American citizens arranged through other means, we should do all that is possible to encourage visits to our country by representatives of Chinese political organizations. At present this interchange is not as equal as we might desire, but continued efforts to encourage exchanges may eventually be successful.

With respect to domestic goals, the Chinese are embarked upon a long-term effort to modernize their country and improve the standard of living of their citizens. We were all impressed with the enormous effort that this course demands of all Chinese. In the countryside in particular, investments of labor, and to a lesser extent of capital, have moved sections of China forward in their efforts. With respect to basic items of food, housing, medical services, and education, they have made substantial progress not only in increasing the availability of these goods and services, but also in distributing them throughout the country. Whether or not they will be able to maintain this progress together with the political conformity they expect from their citizens is not clear. The country still remains very poor and the road to modernization is likely to be long, posing some difficult priority decisions for the leadership. For the present, education, agriculture, industry, all appear organized around the general aim of the leadership to encourage national self-reliance and progress. This will require substantial sacrifices on the part of all citizens to maintain the momentum that has been achieved.

This report details these and related findings of our trip. Our itinerary, together with the text of certain documents, are included in the appendix. For discussions of international relations it is imperative to understand the Shanghai communique to which the Chinese constantly refer. Accordingly, we have included it. Since a substantial portion of our trip involved visits to agricultural sites, and discussions with individuals in the countryside, we have included here a Chinese article on Tachai, which is considered by the leaders an agricultural model for the whole country.

As can be seen from our itinerary as well as from the body of our report itself, high ranking Chinese political leaders gave generously of their time throughout our journey. This afforded us the opportunity to have very frank discussions of considerable length on matters of

mutual interest. These talks were not limited to problems of international relations, but, as our report indicates, dealt with important domestic problems such as education, agricultural development, problems of legal and social education. These meetings were very valuable in providing us the opportunity to raise matters of concern with respect to what we had seen.

Throughout our journey in the People's Republic of China, the thoughtfulness and competence of our Chinese interpreters were matters of extreme importance. We are pleased to acknowledge the central role they played in a successful trip. Although there are strong efforts to increase the number of English speakers in China, they are still few, particularly outside of Peking and Shanghai. The interpreter, therefore, is a key link in communication and understanding.

Throughout our trip we were pleased that numerous efforts were made to accommodate the requests of the delegation although our requests to visit the university and its library, a court in session, and a prison were denied. While problems of transportation and distance dictated that the group travel together in Peking, Kweilin, and Szechwan, our hosts arranged alternate programs in Shanghai in an effort to afford options to the members for visits and discussions. Opportunities to move about on our own tended to be limited to early morning or late afternoon and evening, because of schedule pressures. With few exceptions the members of the delegation were able to move about unrestricted and to photograph as they wished. We were met with intense interest and courtesy even when communication proved impossible. This cooperation was not limited to the delegation. Specific note should be made of the thoughtfulness of our hosts with respect to the television crew which accompanied us. Their work was ably and graciously assisted by the Chinese at all times.

We wish to express our appreciation to a number of individuals who provided assistance. First of all, Gen. Brent Scowcroft and others in the White House, National Security Council, Department of Defense, and Department of State helped facilitate our trip. Prior to our departure, Mr. William Glysteen met with us and reviewed several aspects of U.S. relations with China; the staff of the Freer Gallery provided a briefing on various important historical sites that the delegation could expect to visit. In Hawaii, Admiral Noel Gayler provided us with an excellent briefing and the assistance of his staff.

We wish to commend our administrator, Dr. Joyce Kallgren, vice chair of the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Kallgren shared her expertise on the People's Republic of China with us before, during, and after the trip and provided essential editorial guidance in the preparation of this report.

In Peking, the staff of the American Liaison Office, particularly Acting Chief Harry Thayer and Mr. William Thomas, were hospitable and helpful during our Peking stay.

Finally, we wish to acknowledge with thanks the assistance of the members of the People's Republic of China Liaison Office in Washington who so generously gave of their time during the preparation and planning of the trip, and most of all, the members of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs who were our hosts throughout our stay in China. They were unfailingly courteous and helpful in trying to provide us with an understanding of their country.

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Near the end of one lengthy discussion with a major Chinese political leader, he asked us to report "what the Chinese people are thinking about today." Without question the dominant theme of our discussions was a series of warnings about the Soviet Union and its intentions in contemporary international affairs. In assessing Chinese policies on foreign and security issues, their assumptions about Soviet intentions form the basic ground upon which a number of other options are built. In view of the fact that significant personnel changes may have occurred in China since our visit, the position, tone, and range of our discussions assume greater importance for an American assessment of the continuity of priorities.

Our report on Chinese views in the area of international relations and security is derived from two lengthy discussions, first with Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, and then with Vice Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who together with Madame Li Su-wen met with us for a lengthy morning session. Our impressions were reinforced in more informal discussions with our hosts both in Peking and elsewhere, together with the unstated premise in our briefing in the air raid tunnel in Peking.

Because of their judgments about Soviet intentions and the likelihood of war, a variety of Chinese policies are distinguished in terms of theory and practice with immediate applications to American policies in Europe, primarily in terms of NATO and with respect to the maintenance of American security agreements and forces in certain parts of Asia. Finally, it may well be that the high priority that the Chinese placed on warnings with respect to Soviet developments accounts for the rather limited attention in the discussion to bilateral relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States.

How and why do the Chinese see World War III developing? In theoretical terms, the Chinese said that war developed independent of man's will. In today's world, they believed that talk of détente is an illusion. Despite talk of peace, there isn't any: nor is there genuine disarmament. The reality, they said, was that the international situation day by day is more tense. They did not speak of "imminent" war and their language for a time frame became less precise, with use of such words as likelihood, and such periods as 3, 5, and 7 years, based on the continued development of superpower "hegemony"—which to them means the Soviet Union. Though the Chinese consider both the Soviet Union and the United States as superpowers capable of beginning a third world war, their present observation is that the United States is mainly on the defensive and the Soviet Union mainly in an aggressive posture. Hence their emphasis on a Soviet threat.

The evidence for their position cited in our discussions is quite similar to views expressed in major Chinese foreign publications, such as

the *Peking Review*. Indeed, the language used in our meetings mirrored that published at the time of our visit. The argument runs as follows: the military development and expansion of one superpower, plus its increased involvement in such areas as Europe (Portugal) and Africa (Angola) is strong evidence of long-range intentions. This argument they believed is supported by evidence with respect to nuclear as well as conventional weapons development.

For example, they argued that since the Partial Nuclear Test Ban, the development of military force by the Soviet Union has become more pronounced. Whereas the U.S.S.R. was behind the United States in 1963, it has since caught up, and by the 1974 Vladivostok meetings, the United States had admitted equilibrium. Beyond nuclear balance, our hosts observed, the conventional situation was even more perilous. According to British sources, they said, the Soviet Union exceeded the United States and its Western European allies in conventional weapons, and Soviet naval capabilities are a strong challenge to the United States with a presence in the Pacific, Indian, and Mediterranean. Within the last 10 years, Soviet armed forces have grown from 3 million to 4.2 million. In most areas there is an increase of military bases. The Chinese asked: "What is the use of so many things? Some day their hands will grow itchy."

As for the region in which the war is most likely to occur, the Chinese view is that Europe must be seized and therefore the biggest concentration of force is there. In addition, the Middle East and the Mediterranean are danger points. In the light of the seriousness with which the Chinese speak and write of the likelihood of hostilities, Chinese policies with respect to the American presence in Europe and selected parts in Asia and their views with respect to the military forces of our NATO allies are largely consistent.

When questions on the Chinese policies toward an American presence in Europe and Asia were raised, the Chinese position was expressed on two levels. In theoretical terms, the Chinese call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all countries. This point was clearly stated in all discussions. However, in the light of present circumstances, there is the need to take reality into account. Since one superpower is well armed and is present in Europe and Asia, the Chinese said they understood that the United States had reason to maintain troops in Europe and parts of Asia. Even further, the Chinese urged us to maintain a "truly" equal partnership with European countries and with the Japanese, and said they believed that the United States would do so. The use of the term "certain parts of Asia" was intentional, designed perhaps to exclude Korea. Here removal of our forces was linked to "the peaceful reunification of Korea" with no further elaboration as our hosts indicated this was a complicated problem with a long history.

Beyond supporting a continued military presence, our hosts argued that in view of the arms race which resulted partially from Soviet development, it was desirable that the United States European allies devote more funds to military preparedness, and apparently the Chinese have so advised them. But they also indicated that in their view, increased appropriations might be necessary by the United States. The reason for the increased military preparedness arises from their belief

that only through such preparedness will Soviet hegemony be restrained. Thus they rejected what they saw to be a possible "Munich" trend, arguing that the Soviet Union would only be responsive to a strong posture. It is no use to fear the Soviet Union; if war is inevitable, they said, unpreparedness spells grief.

Given this series of statements, we were extremely interested in Chinese perceptions with respect to their own roles and state of preparation, and accordingly asked them about their policies. They emphasized that they were a peaceful people and yet were making their own defensive arrangements as suggested in the statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung: "Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony." In explaining the implications of this injunction, the Chinese noted its defensive character, a point that was reiterated in a variety of ways. They said that as a developing country there were a number of extremely pressing domestic problems on the road to modernization. They were therefore integrating defensive measures into their overall economic development program. In addition, they believed they were doing their share by the repeated emphasis on Soviet war potential and threats, together with their own internal preparations.

Tangible evidence of their domestic preparations was provided in our tour on January 3 of one of the Peking underground air raid tunnels. The delegation visited the underground air raid tunnel of Ta Sa Lan alley. In a briefing presented to us by Mr. Kao Shih-fen, Director of the General Office of the People's Air Raid Precaution Committee, he outlined the history and development of this tunnel. Using maps and charts, Mr. Kao reported that construction of this tunnel began in 1969 and had continued through stages of development and extension for the past 7 years. The area served was an alley on which there were many department stores and shops (each of which had separate openings to the tunnel area). On normal weekdays there might be a total of 80,000 shoppers in the alley with more on Sundays and holidays. The tunnel as developed could provide shelter for some 10,000 people, all of whom could be underground with a 6-minute warning, based on Chinese experience with air raid practices. We were told that similar tunnels exist in other cities as far north as Harbin.

According to Mr. Kao and our own observations as we walked through the tunnel, a number of safety measures were already in place in the tunnel. There were phones, toilets, running water, underground power and facilities for purifying the air. In addition, the Chinese intend to install hospital facilities and other amenities as circumstances permit. There was space for such development.

We were told that the tunnels were largely built by contributed labor from the 1,800 shopkeepers of the 45 stores on the alley, of whom almost 30 percent were women. Financing was provided partially by the Central government, with the remainder from local sources, but we do not know the percentages. Emphasizing self-reliance, the workers had developed a small brick factory to make bricks from local mud. Mr. Kao indicated the work had been difficult and many obstacles had been encountered because they had little experience in this kind of work. Work itself depended on the yearly

circumstances and plans. In the past year they had installed some equipment and underground silos for grain storage. When we visited it did not appear that a large work force was engaged in the activity.

According to Mr. Kao, many tunnels were connected to other tunnels permitting the people to eventually walk out to the suburbs. In the case of Ta Sa Lan, it was possible to reach the southern suburbs in approximately 3 hours. We do not know to what degree this is true of other underground tunnels in Peking. Surprisingly, our Chinese hosts would not permit filming of the underground facilities, though such films would seem to lend further corroboration to Chinese expressed policy.

In addition to the graphic evidence presented by the tour as support to Chinese statements, we found other references to the storing of grain at various visits to agricultural facilities in Szechwan and Shanghai. There is, therefore, substantial evidence of domestic preparation for war in China. It did not seem to be conducted on an emergency basis but it obviously represents some diversion of resources.

In addition to the question of domestic policies, questions were raised with the Chinese with respect to their general policies of support for national liberation movements specifically with respect to Israel and also with respect to interest in and aid to more distant areas such as Africa. Chinese responses were interesting, not only for their insight into perceptions of national interest, but also as indicative of areas of dominant versus subordinate concern.

With respect to Angola, the Chinese distinguished carefully between what they saw as a war of liberation versus an internal civil struggle. They explained their initial support of liberation forces in Angola as essentially based on their interest in assisting nationalist efforts to force the Portuguese to leave. Once that struggle had been won, the war shifted from a nationalist war to a domestic civil war—which was their view in December 1975 to January 1976. They then withdrew, wishing to avoid alignment with one faction. Partisan support by the Soviet Union—that is, aid to the MPLA—reflected in Chinese eyes deep involvement in an essentially domestic situation, presumably for Soviet interests. The Chinese believed that this Soviet action ran counter to their self-proclaimed policies of noninvolvement in domestic affairs. Chinese criticism emerged largely from the fact that they saw Soviet involvement as coming after the end of the political struggle. The Chinese said they supported the American position calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Subsequent Chinese actions in the United Nations reinforce this statement.

In addition to queries about their position on Angola, we also asked the Chinese to present their views with respect to Chinese interest in and support for the Palestinian liberation movement and for the continent of Africa in general. In these cases, their responses were relatively brief. They reaffirmed their support for the goals of the PLO but in the case of Africa, indicated that though interest in African development remained, because of their own pressing problems there was likely to be considerable limitation to their ability to provide help.

As wide ranging as our discussions were, there was little attention paid to bilateral American-Chinese relations. This was true despite queries about Chinese satisfaction with the result of the visit of Presi-

dent Ford as well as other questions dealing with American-Chinese relations. In the light of the relatively modest amount of attention paid to these problems, in contrast to some prior congressional visits, it is essential to report carefully our impressions.

In our discussions, the Chinese expressed, as they have in published statements, their general satisfaction with the visit of President Ford. They indicated no concern about the lack of a communique, saying that the speeches of all participants might be viewed in lieu of a communique. Since our trip followed relatively closely upon that of President Ford, such a response might have been expected. Perhaps less expected, in the light of earlier congressional visits, was the relatively slight attention paid to the issue of the status or future of Taiwan. At no time did the Chinese choose to initiate direct discussion of Taiwan. The sole reference occurred in their response to a question about how our two countries might move more closely together. In answering they mentioned the Shanghai communique of 1972 and the need for its implementation. Only when asked to be specific did they amend their comments to provide a specific reference to the three conditions, namely (1) withdrawal of all forces from Taiwan; (2) abrogation of the Joint Defense Treaty; and (3) severing of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. They added, however, that they understood that the American Government felt it was difficult at present to implement these policies and they, the Chinese, could wait.

Other queries with respect to bilateral relations were answered but clearly without the depth of analysis that marked our discussions of Soviet threat. Thus on the matter of trade, they acknowledged that its volume would vary from year to year but did not overtly link its level with the establishment of normal diplomatic relations.

Only on the issue of exit visas did the lack of formal relations come to the fore. Here, in response to a request by some congressional Members for attention to certain hardship cases—that is, American citizens of Chinese descent who wished to see aging relatives in China, or where terminal illness made an exit visa to the United States of high priority—did they indicate that regularized relations between our two countries would permit more ease in meeting such requests. They did agree, however, to review the Congresswomen's requests.

DOMESTIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS

To travel through China is to see on every side both the tremendous achievements and problems of the Chinese. Fundamental to success is agriculture; consequently, the stabilization of high yields together with increasing production is an essential component of efforts to raise the standard of living of those in the countryside as well as cities, let alone to modernize the country. It is understandable, therefore, why so much of our visit focused upon one or another aspect of agricultural development.

It should be made clear at this juncture that obviously the development of industry is also essential for China's policy of self-reliance. We will comment at various points on differing aspects of the industrial development with which we had experience, but the overriding impression of our trip, largely occasioned by the emphasis on agricultural units and the extensive traveling in Chengtu and its environs, is the remaining importance of agriculture, as the key to future Chinese achievements. Whether or not the Chinese will be successful in their efforts not only to stabilize agricultural production but also to sustain the rate of progress, through the means they have chosen, remains unclear. But the nature of their efforts and the paths they seem likely to follow appear relatively clear from our trip.

Crucial though agriculture and industry are to China's future, it is equally important to keep in mind the additional goal of China's leaders, namely to maintain the revolutionary spirit and style of action to which they attribute their success in 1949 and which they consider essential for the maintenance of a socialist industry. In this respect, progress should be viewed in the context of a new revolutionary man under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, an understanding of the Chinese agricultural and industrial efforts must be accompanied by a close look at Chinese educational priorities and methods in order to understand the close interdependence of these activities.

In addition to these two emphases, the delegation intends to report here on the broader intentions of Chinese leaders reflected in their social mechanisms for insuring enthusiastic support for socially approved goals together with judicious use of sanctions where necessary. In this context efforts to enhance the role of women serves as a good example of the use of a mass organization to insure support for a social goal. Finally, the delegation reports on the use of sanctions when other means fail.

AGRICULTURE IS THE KEY LINK

Much has been written about the importance of agriculture in China. Many who have visited before us have commented upon developments in China since 1949. Indeed, from the earliest days of

American visitors in the middle of the 19th century, people have known that the livelihood of China and its political stability rested upon the capacity of a leadership to meet the needs for survival of this vast nation, to insure a bare minimum of cereals and vegetables for the nation, and to provide the means of transport so that excess from one sector of the country could be made available to people in less fortunate circumstances. The decline of agricultural productivity in the 20th century is also well known. It was occasioned by a variety of factors; not the least of these were the increasing instability of the society as traditional authority vanished, the erosion of soil and water resources, the decay in transportation systems largely along waterways, and the rising banditry that occurred during the years of the warlords, together with the large scale destruction that accompanied World War II, followed by 4 years of intense civil war.

With the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the nation, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and its leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung, set about to revolutionize the countryside as well as fundamentally to change the means of production in China's rural areas. All of these changes have occurred in the past 27 years against the backdrop of a rising population now estimated to be well over 800 million people. Thus increased production was necessary not only to meet the needs of a burgeoning population but also slowly to raise the standard of living for all of Chinese society.

The developments have followed two paths. There have been efforts to reclaim land, improve the quality of soil, stabilize water supply, lower the saline content of the earth and increase the availability and use of fertilizer. In addition and of equal importance have been the changes in Chinese society that began with land reform, 1949-52. These efforts progressed through mutual aid teams sharing labor; to agricultural cooperatives and advanced agricultural cooperatives which initially provided income and grain on the basis of contributed land and labor, and eventually solely on the basis of labor; up to the communes established in 1958. Substantially refined since then, the communes of 1976 remain the basic administrative unit of China's rural scene, combining local government together with economic policies, social welfare, education, militia training and other functions including much of the local rural industrial development. Varying in geographical size as well as total population they now apparently number about 50,000 and range in population from 10,000 to 50,000.

The communes of China are composed of three levels of political and economic responsibility. At the top is the commune revolutionary committee which manages commune wide activities including hospitals, some social services, together with apportionment of grain targets. Beneath the commune organization unit are the production brigades. The brigades, depending upon geography, population, location, wealth, et cetera, may manage health stations as well as brigade developed sideline activities. Each brigade is composed of a number of production teams frequently similar in size to traditional villages. It is here that work assignments are made and work points determined. No one can be removed from the work assigned in the production team without the concurrence of team leadership.

The income of the individual and the family in rural China is largely determined by the total work points of the family together with the productivity of their efforts as reflected in team output. However a valuable supplement to the income and standard of living of the individual and the family is derived from the private plots. The so-called private plots consist of a small portion of land used for raising pigs, fruit trees, a few chickens, or vegetables. The products so raised are sold to state agencies and the proceeds kept by the family or individual.

In summary therefore, the income of a Chinese family is derived from the combined workpoints of all translated into cash. Some of the funds are used for grain purchases, some for necessities, some for modest luxuries and some saved. In addition, the income may be supplemented by cash or gifts from a child employed elsewhere or in the commune small scale factory where a monthly salary is received.

The purchasing power of the income is relatively high given the fact that commune medical care usually costs 1 yuan per year for eligibility for coverage, that housing in a commune is free or nominal in cost, and school fees, nursery care and most necessary products have not increased in price in the last 20 years.

What is described above is the model commune life. It varies depending upon the total number of laborers/peasants available. Some production teams have a large portion of workers who are aged or too young to engage in full scale production, some teams work rocky soil, of poor quality, where water is distant. In all these cases the total income of the team suffers. In 1975-76 the commune and its constituent parts, the brigade and team constituted the local level reality of life in China.

As indicated above, there is substantial room for differences among the standards of living of individuals in one team or another, indeed between families as well, depending not only on skill but also on family composition and related matters. Because of these differences and the fact that commune life still includes a substantial component of private enterprise represented by the private plots, Chinese Communist leadership has encouraged the development of model production brigades which have usually abolished the private plots and raised the level of decisionmaking above that of the production team (village) to a larger geographic and population level. In the future the new model, referred to as a "Tachai brigade," will become increasingly common in China. Before discussing this future development, however, we want to report on the average commune model, as we saw it.

COMMUNES—PROGRESS TODAY

In the suburbs of Shanghai is P'eng-pu Commune. Located close to this large metropolitan area, to which it can sell its crops, namely vegetables, and from which it could easily buy needed goods, P'eng-pu, by location and by product, is not a typical commune. It is wealthy and serves as a model of how the organizational system may work when conditions are good.

This commune, we were told, is composed of 4,300 families, totaling approximately 21,000 people, divided into nine production brigades and 78 production teams. It covered 820 hectares. In addition to vegetables, some grains are grown. Income is also derived from sideline occupations of fish raising, poultry and small scale industry.

The history of this commune is quite similar to those in other parts in China. After land reform, the level of organization proceeded through mutual aid teams, agricultural producer cooperatives, to advanced producer cooperatives where individuals earned only from their labor (and not for the land they contributed, but were provided the five guarantees of food, clothing, education, fuel and burial). In 1958 the commune was established.

Our hosts gave the delegation a variety of indicators of progress in the commune. Vegetable production was more than 2½ times that of 1949, and double the output of 1957 (before the establishment of the commune). The variety of vegetables had risen from 75 in 1949 to 208 in 1976. In addition to fresh vegetables, the commune raised 23,000 pigs (most of them apparently by families on their private plots) together with 1,000 sheep, 310 cows and 120,000 chickens. An area of 180,000 square meters was used to cultivate a very profitable crop of mushrooms. On the rivers and waterways they raised ducks, fish and cultured pearls. Since 1965 and the Cultural Revolution, commune members had devoted efforts to such projects as the growing of trees around the villages, and emphasized the overall development of animal husbandry and rural mechanization. The profits from income—derived not only from crops but also products of sideline enterprises—have resulted in the purchase of 20 trucks, 139 tractors, and 214 electric pumps. In addition they have built 31 sluice gates for water control, as well as 25 pumping stations for drainage. They installed 12 kilometers of pipe for waste water from Shanghai which (after treatment) was used for irrigation. Machinery repairs were done in the commune as well as the forging of some machine tools.

The result of all these endeavors was to raise the standard of living of the households in P'eng-pu. Our hosts told us that the average income for a household of 4.5 people was 1,000 yuan (\$500 U.S.). Each laborer's income was estimated at 450 yuan a year with expenses estimated at 120 yuan per person leaving a portion for savings. The advantages of the commune were not limited to income. It provided its members with broadcast facilities, a small library, a sparetime peasant college, nine primary schools and one middle school. We were told that in 1975 all children above the age of 7 were in school and that nurseries and kindergartens were located in production teams or brigades.

With respect to health care, the provisions of this commune were standard, namely a commune hospital, clinics at the brigade level and medical workers for the teams. In one home interview, we discovered that the medical program, which was uniformly popular, provided, in serious cases, for treatment outside the commune, where contracts apparently existed between the commune and certain Shanghai hospitals for specialized cases too serious for medical facilities and/or staff of the commune. Since 1968 they had established a comprehensive prepaid medical system where each adult paid 2 yuan and each child 1 yuan for free medical care.

The impressions derived from the briefing and tour were supplemented by visits to selected homes. Various members of the delegation went into small neat homes or apartments (in the case of new dwellings) where they had the opportunity to speak with some of the commune members. Though the specifics differed from family to family, it was clear that the individuals and families we visited were well off. While housing was cramped, it was adequate (though heat was lacking). The average monthly income varied. In one case it was 200 yuan a month, reflecting the fact that the family had five children, all of whom were working full time, and hence the household income was rather high. The respondent in the family indicated that expenses totaled approximately 100 yuan a month, leaving them with substantial savings and hence they had been able to purchase such items as a clock, sewing machine and bicycles. We also learned that some of the peasants contributed one day of work per week to the commune (though we do not know how widespread this practice may be). Formal retirement programs did not exist (as indeed they do not in rural China); rather the work assignments will be reduced to lighter work for aging parents. Children are expected to contribute to the support of their aged parents (and did so gladly).

The conditions just described represent a model case where the commune is favorably located with respect to markets and climate has made maximum use of its advantages together with political organization to raise the standard of living of its population, to finance out of its own profits the costs of increased mechanization and improvement of its lands. Other communes, more remotely located with a somewhat differing population structure, with more difficult terrain and the like may well have progressed less successfully.

TACHAI BRIGADES—MODELS FOR THE FUTURE

Since the efforts of the Chinese leadership are to raise the standards of the whole countryside, and to minimize Government investment, self-reliance is both an economically advantageous policy as well as a politically important one. One consequence of self-reliance, however, is that certain regional and local differences may persist, and indeed widen. Consequently, the country has now adopted a model which shows how self-reliance and hard work may provide progress and reduce differences among areas by raising the productivity of the poorer units. The unit to be emulated is Tachai, a production brigade in the province of Shensi. Tachai was a poor brigade that faced a myriad of obstacles in its efforts to improve the quality of life. But it not only increased its contribution to the state but also improved the living conditions of 80 families (400 people). The Tachai success story illustrates not only the results of hard work and ingenuity, but also the role that changes in administrative organization can bring about, namely the shifting to brigade level of decision-making power with respect to certain economic policies together with the abandonment of the private plots. We have included in our appendix a brief description of Tachai brigade activities as published by the Chinese to illustrate the workings of this model. Now, the slogan "In Agriculture Learn from Tachai" has been echoed through-

out China. In the late summer of 1975, a nationwide conference to discuss the Tachai experience was held and there seems little doubt that this model will continue to be extolled as the future for Chinese agriculture. In the course of our trip, we visited one Tachai-type brigade in the outskirts of Chengtu, Szechuan province, where we saw an example of how this type of organization worked.

Tien Yuan commune is located in Hsintu County quite close to the city of Chengtu. It is composed of some 20,000 individuals who are divided into 15 brigades. Three of the brigades are Tachai-type brigades and we visited one of them. The production brigade we visited was composed of 13 production teams made up of 486 households with a population of 2,036 individuals and a laboring force of 973. It cultivates a total of 219 mou or 36 plus acres (a mou is equal to one-sixth of an acre).

We were told that efforts, under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and members of the brigade, emphasized self-reliance and making an effort to carry out the revolution and "work hard to change the face of this country." In the course of the briefing we learned what this effort required and what had been achieved. The products of this brigade were rice, wheat, rape seed, tobacco, and honey. The production of grain in 1949 was 200 kilos-per-mou and by 1975 was 900 kilos-per-mou. By 1975 the brigade was raising 2,053 pigs. From 240 hives of bees they had gathered 24,000 kilos of honey, in addition to growing some 1.7 million vegetables for the city of Chengtu. Coupled with the emphasis on agriculture this brigade had organized individuals into other occupations such as house repair, grain processing, and a variety of small-scale industries such as the making of clothes, straw hats, baskets, et cetera. From this agricultural base together with the occupations the brigade has been able to expand production and accumulate savings sufficient for the purchase of 7 trucks, 2 rice harvesters and rice grinders, 40 threshers, 2 sets of electric pumping stations as well as finances to set up the grain and sideline production shops. They were able, thus, to semimechanize the land. With the growth of products, the contribution to the state was larger, the public accumulation of funds for the brigade increased, and the living standards of the people also improved.

Here as in Shanghai, general prosperity was translated into individual terms. Each individual received 565 jin of grain. Annual income was 124 yuan per person. Thus, the brigade was not only able to have sufficient food and clothing but many citizens had a bicycle, radio, watch, or sewing machine.

As in the commune, the attention to education and development of medical facilities ranked high in the estimation of the brigade members. Before 1949 no individual had been to the university and only three persons had attended middle school. Since 1949, 21 had been to the university and 370 to middle school. The brigade had itself developed a primary and a middle school (based on the so-called "open door" policy which was designed to integrate schoolwork with production). All may attend these schools without entrance examinations. We were told that frequently old peasants come to lecture at the school and explain how difficult circumstances were before 1949. All students participated in production work in the field.

With respect to health care, as recently as 1965, doctors were few and health facilities quite limited. Since then a medical station at the brigade has been established and five "barefoot doctors" work with teams. The individuals pay 1 yuan per year for medical care and it is provided free within the brigade. The welfare fund of the brigade is available for assistance if care outside is necessary.

The brigade representatives emphasized the work that remained. Their plans reflected the continuing agricultural emphasis. They had hopes of achieving 1 ton of grain per man per year as well as electrification by the 1980's. They intended to emphasize the planting of trees around the villages, fields, roads, and canals. They believed that an important development for them would be the building of an aqueduct. Their emphasis on the future was reflected in their summary assessment "our production level is still not very high and the level of mechanization still low . . . we have a long way to go yet to what is required of us by the party and Chairman Mao."

The discussions above focused upon two examples of the successful integration of political goals together with the economic realities of the development cycles. These two units, P'eng-pu and the "Tachai" brigade in Tien Yuan Commune demonstrated the ability of agricultural units to maximize advantages partially through political mobilization, but also through the development of social services (such as schools and hospitals) to supplement still low individual incomes. These success stories are impressive, but they are not universal in China.

THE AGE-OLD PROBLEM OF WATER

In a number of instances, the problems of Chinese agriculture are beyond the scope of a single commune. For example, a large-scale effort involving a work force equal to the total population of two communes of the P'eng-pu size were concentrated in one single irrigation campaign we observed. It should be kept in mind, therefore, that many of China's agriculture problems require efforts beyond those of a single commune. This is particularly true in programs to develop water resources for agriculture. During our visit we had the opportunity to look closely at one such development. Its achievements and limitations are a good example of the range remaining in China.

The irrigation project of Tukiangyen is located about 51 li from Chengtu. Szechuan, of which Chengtu is the capital, is often referred to as the ricebowl of China because it has a fertile plain which has provided excess rice for the other provinces of China. For more than 2,000 years, Chinese leaders have recognized the importance of water conservancy for the rice needs of China's peasants.

Many have argued that the immense nature of the irrigation and water transportation projects has either caused or most certainly reinforced the need for a central government capable of developing and organizing the work forces necessary to control water in China. Thus over 2,200 years ago, a local magistrate, engineer Li Po, in the Chengtu area initiated the irrigation project which our delegation visited in 1976. He recognized the need for water control of the Min River and initiated a canal system together with a dike for diversion into an inner and outer canal. Since that time, peasants in the area have built

up rich lands in the lower areas of the Min and the magistrate himself has been honored by the Chinese Communist leaders who have refurbished a local temple testifying to the high esteem in which they hold him.

Since its beginning about 250 B.C., the condition of the irrigation system has varied depending upon political developments. Our hosts told us the system had fallen into severe disrepair by 1949 but that since then they had recognized that "water conservancy is the lifeline of agriculture" and continuous efforts had been devoted to expanding and strengthening the system.

In 1949 we were told only 2 million mou were irrigated by the system. By 1958 this had increased to 5.9 million mou. At this time Chairman Mao visited the area, pointed out certain improvements to be made in the continued remodeling of the system, and commented that "Building Socialism" required the development of water conservancy. By 1975 the project was providing irrigation for 8 million mou of land. The short range goal was to reach 10 million mou and the longer range plan some 15 million mou.

The importance of the system and the complicated consequences of its development require more than the above brief description. In order to understand the role of the project and the scope of personnel involved, some background on agricultural development in this province is essential. Roughly 12 percent of the arable province of Szechuan is irrigated, and in 1972 some 12 percent of 840,000 mou were cultivated. In view of the importance of the province as a supplier of grain to other parts of China, great emphasis has been placed on the achievement of high stable yield. In 1956 the targets for this province were set at 800 jin (400 kilo) per mou, which has apparently not yet been achieved for the province, though it had for the model we visited. The contribution of Tukiangyen has been in reclaiming previously dry land, in stabilizing water resources and hence providing some security for production by communes in this rich area. Assuming that roughly a one-fourth ton of grain is allotted for a person, each additional ton of export grain provides for a rising standard of consumption as well as making available additional resources for the government (which established goals and prices for the communes).

The period of Chinese Communist leadership has seen a steady expansion of areas irrigated in Szechuan. In some years, dry lands were brought under irrigation through aqueducts and building of pumping stations and pipelines in the Tu Kiang Yen project. In other years reinforcement of the embankments together with development of dams have made it possible to regulate the water flow, control for floods and develop some hydroelectric capacity. It must be kept in mind that the irrigation system not only supports agriculture but also provides benefits to industry together with its transportation functions.

One consequence of burgeoning water conservancy projects was that substantial organizational problems increasingly appeared. For example, revising canals and enlarging their capacities had implication for the small fields that are normally tended by teams and even brigades. The development of the system and its accompanying canals has implications for boundaries, responsibilities and developments within each commune as well as between communes themselves. These

problems were recognized in brigade discussions, when Chinese leaders said that the economics of mechanization, even at the low level at which they were planning, might require the realignment of fields and assignments in order to maximize the use of equipment. In terms of the water system such problems were clearly on the horizon.

Though the Tukiangyen project was managed by a modest force of technicians totaling some 400 in all, some aspects of related projects were massive in their labor needs. For example, returning from the visit to the project itself, we had the opportunity to observe at close hand one small portion of the canal changes required in the project. We encountered a large irrigation force involving 40,000 people¹ engaged in filling in an old canal and digging a new one. This work force—drawn from the surrounding nine communal counties—had undertaken to complete the task in 1 month. When one considers that the work forces in the communes we visited averaged approximately 50 percent of the total commune population we estimate that the 40,000 workers constituted the total work force of four communes and/or half the work force of eight. The work was done by hand, probably in a manner similar to the way the old magistrate built his first irrigation project 2,000 years ago.

Information about financing for the project was difficult to get. No figures on total costs were available to us, but the ongoing funding of the project was raised from a water tax of one yuan per mou of land that was irrigated by the Min River Tukiangyen project, providing once again an example of local self-reliance and financing.

THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY—DUAL DEVELOPMENT

As our itinerary shows, the opportunities to visit industrial sites were limited. Formal visits by members of the delegation were made to a textile factory in Kweilin and an electrical machinery factory in Shanghai. It would be misleading, however, to assume that evidence of industrial development was limited to these two visits. In all the agricultural sites visited, mention was made of the close relation between agriculture and industry, and we had numerous occasions to see small scale enterprises affiliated with communes, the brigade, and schools—both middle and college. In addition, the tour through the Shanghai Industrial Exhibition afforded the opportunity to discuss with our hosts the variety of products that China now produces for itself.

From a number of standpoints the lack of emphasis on large scale urban industry is reflective of the reality of industrial development in China, and of Chinese hopes for the future. In order to place this reality in perspective, it is essential to keep in mind certain characteristics of industrial development that characterized China in 1949. When China began to develop industrial capabilities in the late 19th century, there were substantial handicaps. The difficulties came not only from domestic problems of transportation and lack of skilled labor, but also the consequences of the unequal treaty system. The industry that did develop tended to be located on the eastern seacoast, in and around the treaty ports and in the northeastern provinces orig-

¹ Congresswoman Holtzman recalls they were told "20,000" people.

inally detached by Japan in the pre-World War II period and developed under Japanese control. The capacities of plants were limited by the bombing and dislocation of the Sino-Japanese War, the destruction that accompanied the final months of World War II, as well as the civil war which followed. In the early years of the Chinese Communist Government, with substantial Soviet help, old industrial sites were repaired and enlarged, and new ones established. But the emphasis on local development with local financing for local markets was largely a consequence of decisions made after 1958 when the communes were established.

Between 1959-62, the Chinese people endured years of hardship caused by weather difficulties, the withdrawal of Russian technicians as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and poor planning and organization by the Chinese themselves. Once recovery from the drastic agricultural difficulties had occurred the Chinese embarked upon a careful modernization program that was designed to decentralize industry and provide for local products at the same time that basic industrial capacity, controlled by central government ministries, was expanded. By 1975-76, there were scores of small-scale enterprises financed and largely directed by communes and brigades who supply local articles for consumption, or, on subcontract, to nearby factories. There were also small school factories, subcontracting from nearby plants and industrial complexes. At the same time the large-scale centrally financed and directed industries in the basic fields of armaments, machine plants, and highly complex and interdependent projects such as the Anshan Steel Works also expanded.

In the light of Chinese developments since 1965 and the aftermath of the great proletarian cultural revolution, industrial development continues as a high priority but without one of the characteristics commonly expected in the western society. The Chinese intend to try and industrialize without urbanizing. That is, they intend to emphasize the self-reliance theme found everywhere in China and already mentioned with respect to agriculture, and to avoid the gigantic growth of cities with their concomitant problems.

Their efforts to develop local industry locally financed have had a number of sequences. Locally financed industry lessens the drain on central government resources. Locally developed factories can be integrated into communes providing the opportunity for increased profits at the commune level while reducing pressure for urbanization common to many other countries' modernization efforts. The difficulties of such a policy are very substantial. They derive from problems of transportation, economies of scale and of capital needs. For the present, Chinese leaders are committed to this policy. In visits to smaller urban areas, they emphasize the capacity of an area, for example Chengtu and Kweilin, to be productive cities rather than consumptive cities. In the visits to smaller as well as larger factories they reiterated the contribution of both to the building of a socialist society.

We saw numerous examples of this dual development. This report has mentioned elsewhere the factories found in the agricultural sites. In our visit to the West Changan Neighborhood Association—discussed later in this report—we were told that some women (working on a piece rate at home) provided articles subcontracted from Peking

factories. The Shanghai electrical machinery factory, which some members of the delegation visited, was a large-scale factory, the textile factory in Kweilin was not and deserves close attention.

The Kweilin silk spinning factory is located on the outskirts of one of the most famous cities in China. Traditionally known as a resort site with remarkably beautiful scenery, Kweilin now includes a substantial industrial capacity while still remaining a resort area. The factory we visited was one example of this. The factory—commissioned in 1968 during the cultural revolution—included spinning, loom, and silk printing machinery, all of which had been produced in China and installed by the staff and workers of the factory. The seven workshops in the factory together produced pongee silk, cotton, a cotton-silk mix, some synthetic fibers and pure silk for the covers of quilts. Of the 2,400 staff members and workers approximately 65 percent were women and of the cadres in the factory some 40 percent were women.

The factory ran round the clock with three shifts per day and workers rotated from week to week among the shifts. The output of the factory has increased enormously since 1970. We did not receive absolute figures, but were limited to percentage increases. In 1975 the factory produced more than 4 times the output of 5 years earlier (1969). The capacity to produce different products had increased from 17 items in 1970 to 42 items in 1975. At the same time efforts had been successful to increase quality control and through technical innovations to reduce labor intensity. Some examples were given to us. The machine developed in the factory had reduced the need for 21 workers; in the weaving workshop they had installed electric chairs (which we saw) which reduced the burdens on each worker and yet left the individual free to be able to handle more looms.

The factory wages were relatively low but the benefits which accompanied them substantial. The average income was 50-yuan a month with a low of 40 and a high of 80 yuan. Though there had been modest increases in the factory minimum over the past 6 years, apparently no increase had occurred for those at the top grade of 80 yuan. This information confirmed other indications of Chinese efforts to reduce the discrepancy between workers' salaries. When asked about the need for incentives to insure high level production and quality control, our hosts told us that they relied upon the workers understanding their role and contribution to the building of a Communist China.

This factory provided the full range of welfare benefits and services. Some housing was available in the factory, specifically dormitories for the unmarried and apparently some minimal housing for married couples though most married women lived in the nearby city. Prenatal examinations for pregnant women were provided from the seventh month with options for reduced work by assignment to lighter tasks, and provisions for nursing mothers to continue feeding their infants. The factory ran a primary school, and provided nurseries for infants over 56 days of age as well as kindergarten for the preschoolers. Medical facilities were available.

The factory, governed by a revolutionary committee under the direction of the city of Kweilin, from whom it received production targets, had been successful, however, in constantly exceeding its quotas. In addition to the administrative operations of the revolutionary com-

mittee there was also an active trade union responsible for the education and welfare of the workers. Trade union dues were 30 cents per month deducted from the salaries of the workers. We were not able to learn about the mobility within the factory, that is, the promotion of workers to staff, or cadres, but our hosts reported that turnover was exceedingly low. When asked, the union leaders told us that they never raised questions concerning wages or workloads.

REVOLUTIONARY EDUCATION

Whether or not the Chinese Communist leadership will be able to continue the momentum found in agriculture and industry without resorting to the incentive systems common to most non-Communist societies and indeed in other socialist systems depends in very large measure upon Chinese effectiveness in instilling and maintaining revolutionary values in their citizenry. Consequently, education in China is exceedingly important and cannot be divorced from the politics of the society. In fact, political indoctrination is not only a major component but essentially a goal of all Chinese education. In the light of these assumptions, two statements of Chairman Mao are worth noting. "Education must serve proletarian politics and be combined with productive labour" and "Our educational policy must enable everyone who receives an education to develop morally, intellectually, and physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousness and culture."

Since 1949 the Chinese have developed education on an immense scale. By 1975 the number of university, middle school, and primary school students was more than one-fifth of the total population. Assuming only 800 million people, that means 160 million pupils. The need for schools, textbooks, and teachers to serve this student body is enormous and, given the population pyramid, will grow before it begins to level off. Chinese efforts are not limited to the conventional universities, colleges, and middle and primary schools but include a variety of workers' colleges run by factories, peasant colleges run by communes, short term courses administered through universities and factories, correspondence courses, vocational schools, part-work part-study schools and technical schools for the rural population.

Beyond the school itself, a wide range of organizations are involved in education. In addition to schools run by the state, many of the primary schools are run by and financed by rural communes and some brigades. Classes are designed to take advantage of local conditions. We were informed that there are mobile schools that move between remote villages, or pastoral schools for herdsmen. Education is not confined to the schools. As we discovered on our trip, workers, peasants, officeworkers, the army men, clerks and people in city neighborhoods spend part of their spare time in small groups studying newspapers, learning foreign languages, or participating in other on-the-job training programs. Consequently it is difficult to generalize about the system.

On the other hand, the emphasis on education was one of the important aspects of contemporary life in China that our hosts wished to highlight for us. By arranging for us to visit a primary school, a

middle school, and a college, together with kindergartens and nurseries, where education begins, plus the constant references in briefings to the educational revolution in China, which they date from the cultural revolution, we have been able to observe a fairly broad cross section of Chinese efforts.

It is essential to an understanding of education in China that one recognize the broadscale setting in which it occurs. Thus, the broadcasting stations, the local newspapers, together with study groups: all are designed to integrate politics and education. The afterschool activities conducted in the cities and neighborhood associations, the skills imparted, the social messages implicitly and explicitly conveyed constitute a massive effort to insure the continued participation of China's youth in a revolution that most of them, some 27 years after the end of the civil war, have not directly experienced.

This report on education includes observations on a discrete series of institutions and concludes with some general observations on characteristics of the system. The need to describe one institution at a time should not overshadow the constant emphasis on integrating social values throughout the system, which is a hallmark of the Chinese experience.

PRESCHOOL AND PRIMARY GRADES

Beyond the creches which serve to care for the children of employed parents and are available as early as 56 days after birth, the nurseries and kindergartens of China begin the indoctrination process as well as imparting skills and knowledge necessary for life in China. As we observed in the nursery and kindergarten facilities of Peng-pu commune children are grouped in classes by age with the normal grouping reflecting each 6-month cohort. The facilities and equipment in most of these nurseries and kindergartens are rather sparse by American standards except for those in large industrial settings. The emphasis when the children are old enough is upon development of cooperative social patterns, mutual aid and help, some familiarity with the national language (many of the children may speak the local dialect at home) and the learning of songs, dances, and some simple games designed to enhance physical well-being and coordination. One of the songs we heard referred to "our brothers in Taiwan," others to Chairman Mao and the beauty of cooperation.

Primary school facilities differ widely. As in the United States, urban schools based upon the neighborhood pattern—often built before 1949—are likely to be larger and have more varied courses. Textbooks are more abundant, equipment better and more diverse. In the Chengtu brigade we visited, facilities were simple and limited. Certain problems confront the rural education system. One difficulty arises from living patterns. Villages on a production team are small—frequently 20-30 families—and therefore the population is often insufficient for a school. Lacking transportation, small children may have a considerable distance to walk. During winter this undoubtedly influences attendance. In the Shanghai commune, we learned that schools were assigned on the basis of the home locations without regard to whether or not the school was managed by the commune in which the parents worked. Such patterns are familiar to Americans. Still, dis-

tance is a major difficulty for the young and undoubtedly is a problem in the more remote areas which we did not visit.

As early as preschool, the emphasis on combining education with production becomes apparent. We were told that in urban schools there may be a small school garden to impress upon the youngster the importance of agriculture; there is always a short work period for the younger students to do simple tasks such as packing flashlight bulbs to acquaint them with the importance of labor. Through lectures and stories told to children by retired workers and peasants, the young pupils learn of the value of work. The emphasis is more pronounced at the middle school, where students are older.

MIDDLE SCHOOLS—PREPARING FOR THE COUNTRYSIDE

Students in China begin middle school at approximately 12 years of age, equivalent to American junior high students. This is because primary school, started at 7, is generally 5 years in duration, though some variation apparently exists. Middle school may vary between 4- and 5-year curriculums with 2 years considered "lower middle school" and 2 to 3 years "upper." Some graduate after only the "lower course"; this is particularly true in the countryside with its limited facilities.

It is at the middle school level that the Chinese "open door" policy is made a key element of education. In the United States an "open door" policy is most commonly assumed to refer to admissions and most frequently used in terms of college and university admissions. In China, the "open door" policy refers to the close integration between theory and practical experience and refers to the need to consider the whole world as one's school. Thus in middle schools, students are expected not only to complete the regular course of study but also to participate in productive labor. Depending upon the location of the middle school, the economic conditions of the managing institution and a variety of other factors, such as distance, the school activities, the inclass projects, and the afterschool programs will be designed to reinforce this close relationship between education and productive labor. In theoretical terms this policy is designed to prevent the emergence of an elite intellectual class unable and more importantly unwilling to participate in the difficult labor necessary to build a Communist China.

Beyond this important theoretical justification, the maintenance of the rural-urban ratio in China requires that the students in the city be able to participate in agricultural activities and that countryside pupils develop skills that will fit them for a lifetime—if not as peasants then as skilled technicians, accountants, or cadres in the countryside.

It is this aspect of education in China continued into university life which is the most controversial and the most interesting. We observed, for example, in the No. 1 Middle School in Shanghai, affiliated with the Shanghai Teachers Training College, students engaged in practicing acupuncture on patients from the city population, preparing them to serve in the countryside as "barefoot doctors" (that is, limited trained medical workers able to provide first level medical care to China's rural population). In middle school classes, our hosts told us, courses in mathematics and sciences draw upon rural conditions and examples for the learning of scientific formulas and mathe-

matical procedures. As in American society, certain values are implicit in textbook examples. In Chinese schools the politics of the society are integrated wherever possible into the examples of classroom study. Quotations and writing of Chairman Mao Tse-tung were standard texts for middle school students in Chinese language and grammar classes. Depending upon location, middle schools have developed small factories designed to provide some training for their students as well as practical evidence of the need to combine education and productive labor. While participation in productive labor may be limited to one period a week for the smaller children in primary schools, the requirement is more substantial in middle schools either on a daily basis or a week or two assignment in a factory. In addition, we saw middle school students in Shanghai preparing to go to the countryside for short periods of work. Our guides told us that by working in the countryside, living in peasant homes, and cooking their own meals, these students would learn about the reality and importance of labor for China rather than consider it as a remote fact of economic life.

In addition to the formal school setting, some urban children have access to the so-called "children's palaces" where they have the opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities and recreation. In Shanghai there are 10 such facilities spread about the city. The one we visited, called Pu-tuo District Children's Palace, was built in 1960 and provided services to 1,500 children a day between the ages of 7 to 12 years. Children were selected by the schools in this district on a rotational basis and were supposed to return to their schools and teach their classmates. We were told that the children were selected on the basis of politics and talent, but we did not discover the relative weight of the two factors nor how politics is judged for children under 12. When discussing this matter with one guide, the suggestion was made that perhaps politics might be reflected in the conduct of the child in his school.

The children performed for us and told us about their activities. The classes covered such activities as dance, music, with the development of children's orchestras as well as teaching of piano and accordion, ship and airplane-model building, the construction of radios, physical education, and theater skits. The quality of performance was uniformly high and the children showed a consistently high sense of self-confidence and comfort in meeting with us. The content of the performances reflected the values of the society. For example, a ping-pong ballet had the theme of "Friendship First, Competition Second." A song and dance performance entitled "Moving the Boulder" showed individuals alone failing in a task but when they worked together succeeding. Another performance of a Taiwan dance was one of the few overt references to the unended civil war. The students also told us that they were writing to their big brothers and sisters who were working in the countryside giving them encouragement for their revolutionary contribution.

Thus in classroom, productive labor, and after school activities, the education system of the People's Republic reinforced values that would prepare students for work in the countryside and perhaps a lifetime there.

HIGHER EDUCATION—THE CONTROVERSY

At the college level, the consequence of the integration of political values and education is most clear and most controversial. This is true not only for us as visitors to China but also apparently for the Chinese themselves who are still engaged in reassessment of changes that have been brought about in higher education.

Supporters of the current Chinese higher education policies will explain the changes of the last decade in the following manner. Though education in universities and colleges had expanded and changed to some extent, prior to the 1966 cultural revolution, education, throughout China but particularly at the upper levels had—according to the Communist theory—become too specialized, elitist, emphasizing only theory, and remote from the practical life of the people of China. Students would spend 16 to 20 years in educational institutions and yet be unable to participate in the general life of the society. Even more dangerous in the view of Chairman Mao was the development of a separation between mental and physical labor. The cause of this problem in education is laid at the door of revisionists in Chinese society who had strayed from the appropriate path. These so-called "capitalist roaders" had seized power prior to 1966.

Between 1966-69 Chinese higher education—as well as middle and lower schools—went through some profound changes. Universities and colleges were closed for 3 years while curricula were changed, and admission procedures altered to rely primarily upon the recommendations of the Communist Party Committees with few if any examinations. Today middle school graduates must work for a minimum of 2 years in the countryside or factories before they may be considered for university attendance. The student presents himself, he must be endorsed by the members of his work unit, approved by the higher-party level and his name will then be forwarded to certain colleges for special courses of study based upon the needs of the state as well as the listed choices of the student. By late fall of 1975, some Chinese universities had developed informal examinations, others had imposed more formal tests for admissions, largely on the basis of dissatisfaction with the academic level of students. The issue of the appropriateness of entrance examinations and the role of examinations, as well as graduate training had become a controversial topic in China prior to our arrival. Posters criticizing the Minister of Education had appeared on college campuses and lines were being drawn over the issue of political substance versus problems of academic quality. The delegation therefore wished to visit an institution of higher education and observe this problem at first hand.

Although we were refused permission to visit the Peking University, the opportunity was afforded us to spend a morning session at the Central Institute of the Nationalities (a college designed to train national minority cadres). Since 1951 this institute has trained more than 10,000 individuals in various fields. The courses of study were, (1) politics—designed for cadres of the various non-Han nationalities who needed work in the political theory of Marx-Lenin/Mao Tsetung thought prior to returning for work at the grassroots level; (2) language training in the translation and interpreting of various

minorities' languages including such languages as Korean, Manchu, and Uighur; (3) Han language, that is, the national language of China; (4) history—the history and traditions of China as well as various national minorities; (5) art, music, dance and fine arts; and (6) cadre training. In addition to these courses of study there was also a variety of 1- or 2-year cultural courses for students from the national minorities areas to raise their cultural level before they could study in other Chinese universities and medical schools.

The current student body was comprised of 1,700 students from 46 nationalities, border areas and regions. The full course was normally 3 years of study, cadre training was 1 year and the dance and fine arts category required 4 years. In addition, in the previous year, some 8,000 students had participated in short-term courses, generally less than a year in duration.

The library at the institute had only Albanian, Vietnamese and Czech newspapers, and the only magazine available was a Chinese publication translated into various languages. There is a good supply of Western musical scores and art books, including an excellent, but very old, encyclopedia of art of the world.

The chairman of the National Minorities Institute emphasized the changes in the education system since the cultural revolution. He summarized the change in admission and confirmed that instead of the old exams, enrollment came from workers and peasants in the various areas with the recommendation of the units and the approval of the higher authority. In addition to changes in admission there have been changes within the institute. Classes are now combined with periods of work in the countryside, emphasizing the "open door" policy. In addition, relations between the students and teachers have changed in the direction of a greater equality rather than the sharp division between those who taught and those who studied.

Mr. Li, chairman of the revolutionary committee of the institute, acknowledged that differences still existed with some who believed that the quality of education was too low. He agreed that the system itself was still undergoing change.

In the course of an extended discussion period about changes in the institute, Mr. Li explained that the percentage of women had increased among the students up to the present level of 30 percent. He discussed the placement of graduates in some detail, indicating that in principle individuals should return to the places from which they came. However, now they were assigned by a local committee and some were sent to responsible positions utilizing the skills learned in the institute while others returned home. The ages of students varied, those coming for the cadre training course were often in their forties and fifties, those in the regular course in the early twenties, and those for training in the fine arts, dancing, et cetera as young as 11 and 12.

A conversation ensued over the problem of the brilliant student, particularly gifted in one area, but without special interest in politics. Mr. Li denied the existence of "gifted students" but when pressed agreed that some were "quick." Also, he denied the value of abstract thinking without recourse to the reality of life and indicated that with respect to such a student the school would make extra effort to enhance the student's political awareness to match his special abilities.

In an assessment of such awareness, the manifestation and implementation of political consciousness are deemed important, for they are the qualities which make such awareness apparent.

MAY 7TH CADRE SCHOOL—CONTINUING EDUCATION FOR BUREAUCRATS

To this point we have discussed educational institutions within the conventional framework of primary, middle, and university. Beyond that system there remains the schools that have emerged since the cultural revolution to provide reinforcement of political awareness together with physical labor for those individuals who by profession or assignment are required to engage in mental effort remote from physical labor. A product of the cultural revolution, the May 7th cadre school is designed to reinforce and renew commitment to political ideology together with requiring physical labor for Chinese cadres and administrators. The close intermingling of political study with physical labor for extended periods of time in austere conditions away from one's family and without regard to the special skills of participants raises important questions of human resource utilization. The delegation was pleased to have the opportunity to visit such a school and to raise some questions about its operation with the students and staff.

The term "May 7th" cadre school is drawn from a statement of Chairman Mao published on May 7, 1968, calling for the development of a new type school. The institution we visited was called the Chung Wen district May 7th cadre school. Established in October 1968, it is now 7 years old. The students who attend it are apparently all drawn from the Chung Wen suburb of the city of Peking. Since its initiation, some 3,800 men and women have completed the course of study. The current term is 6 months. It appears, however, that the length of study in a May 7th school may vary. In the first few years after establishment, lacking experience and perhaps with a different political climate, the terms were longer. Some of our guides indicated that they had spent 1 or 2 years in other May 7th schools. In the late 1960's the schools were also less formally organized, with facilities often limited to a few buildings. The students lived for the duration of their study in local peasant homes. This latter condition apparently caused some social difficulties. By the mid-1970's schools have separate facilities.

Chung Wen's students came from the nearby area, and were drawn largely from people who might be classified as teachers and white collar workers, such as the chairman and vice chairman of shops, schools and administrative organizations in Chung Wen district together with teachers from middle and primary schools. Pupils would be in school for 6 months with the opportunity to return home for visits once or twice a month. When we visited the student body was composed of 250 individuals of whom 50 percent were women, varying in age from the early twenties, into the fifties. Most we met were apparently in their middle twenties or early thirties. One woman teacher proudly told us, however, that she was in her forties and had to persuade her school that her age and health should not constitute a barrier to attendance. This suggested that physical conditions and other factors may play a role in final assignment.

Our hosts told us that selection for the school was a somewhat complicated matter. In general, each cadre ought to take a turn, once every 5 years, but the various constituent organizations made their selection on the basis of their own needs. The students with whom we spoke had all volunteered but we do not know whether or not this is true for all. In general, we were told about 50 percent of the students were Communist Party members or members of the Young Communist League, the remaining were nonparty individuals. Though militia members—normally part-time—might well be in attendance, no Army personnel were included. We were told that there are separate schools for the military, with perhaps different curricula and work. While in attendance at the school, the individual's pay remains the same as when he or she was working in his or her unit, hence there was no hardship for their families. We were told that most were married.

The district party organization governed Chung Wen through the party committee of the school. Presumably their supervision was general in nature and perhaps focused upon the substantive topics studied, since the May 7th school revolutionary committee was responsible for administration. Throughout the school, emphasis was upon cooperation between the teachers and students and extensive use of self-study for much of the work.

The curriculum used important documents in the history of the party together with current event materials. Thus the emphasis in 1975 was upon a close study of "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat"; in 1974 they had emphasized Lenin's "On Imperialism," "The Gotha Programme" and "Anti-Duehring." When we visited the students, they were working on the January 1 editorials of the Chinese press together with January 1 poems of Chairman Mao. We asked them how long they might focus upon these materials and they responded that the work might be expected to last 6 to 8 weeks.

Political study of Marxism-Leninism and a reviewing of the contribution of Chairman Mao as well as current events was only one-half the emphasis in a May 7 school. The other half, equally important, we were told, was physical labor together with establishing a deep understanding of the needs and work techniques of the peasants and workers of China. The second part of the May 7 emphasis was accomplished by a rigorous program of physical labor on the part of all students coupled with trips to the villages to learn from the peasants, hear stories from the older peasants, and in the course of a 3-week period spent living with peasants in the villages, reaffirm for the cadre the importance of serving the people, heart and soul. Each was expected to take part in the heavy physical labor associated with the school's agricultural activities. Through such work, the school expected to enhance the political understanding of the individuals, and narrow the problems between city and countryside, worker and peasant, and labor and intellectual labor.

Throughout their stay in the school, students were expected constantly to review their development and, upon completion of their stay, to write an extended summary of their experience. This report would be read by members of the party committee of the school. Our hosts emphasized that attendance in the school was neither to serve as a means for higher position, nor for membership in the party.

The daily schedule of the students varied with the season. While in summer the work began earlier, in winter the schedule was as follows:

6:30- 7:30	Rise, P.E., and exercise, cleanup of living area.
7:30- 8:00	Breakfast.
8:00-12:00	Study or labor.
12:00- 1:30	Lunch and rest.
1:30- 5:00	Labor and/or study.
5:30- 7:00	Dinner.
7:00- 9:00	Conference, study, meeting, or recreation.
9:00	Sleep.

The school we visited was spartan in its makeup. We visited students in their dormitories, which also served as a place of study. They were simply constructed with 12 individuals in a single room. Other buildings contained a mess hall, meeting place. There were simple recreational facilities such as a basketball court. Apparently singing and theatrical performances are encouraged because we were entertained by a lively singing group of students.

Questions about the operation of May 7 schools remained. In addition to schools based upon districts, others are apparently jointly sponsored by administrative units in the government. While the students at Chung Wen could return home every 2 weeks, cadre schools located in more remote areas distant from the homes of their students obviously imposed more of a hardship. Within the school, there seemed to be an easy relationship among the students. We were told that the school had achieved a general equality between men and women. They said, however, that men were not too adept at washing things and women helped. On the other hand, no man in the school served tea, suggesting that some roles still remained stereotyped.

Beyond the formal schooling possibilities we have described, there were other institutions in China which played an educational role. Television sets are increasingly seen in Chinese cities. Besides the integration of political values into the entertainment medium through movies, singing, news reporting, and television, the medium serves straight educational purposes. For example, English and Japanese are now taught on radio and television and numerous Chinese are working hard to learn these foreign languages.

In P'eng-pu commune we visited a radio broadcasting facility. First established in 1958, with apparent updating of equipment since then, this station was connected to all loud speakers in the commune. National news was relayed from Peking at set times. Youngsters were encouraged to develop skits or programs for general listening according to a broadcast schedule. Announcements and music were also part of its output. The local papers as well as the People's Daily are very inexpensive (0.035 cents per copy) and serve to indicate leadership priorities for the readers. Though we saw only a few films, they served not only to show Chinese achievements to their population but also to fulfill an educational purpose.

We were impressed by the magnitude of the task that has confronted the Chinese in their efforts to provide educational opportunities to their population. Their resourcefulness in developing schools, providing materials, and integrating the primary and middle schools into local structures not only for direction but also for financing had

many attractive aspects. Their efforts to avoid a large intellectual elite that is unemployed have obvious advantages to the leadership, particularly where they seek to raise city and countryside standards of living together. Clearly middle school graduates can make important contributions to their country's development.

The social and economic costs of this program may be high, depending on how thoroughly its policies are carried out. Students we met did not indicate any personal preferences in response to queries about their interests or hopes for future careers. Beyond a few generalizations, we learned little about the allocation of university students to special programs. The system as presently operative does not seek out the specially gifted intellectual who may only be interested in mathematics or science; indeed, such a student would face strong pressure to change his viewpoint. Though there are obvious advantages to requiring students to spend at least 2 years in the countryside before even applying for university training, this 2-year intermission coupled with the shortened course of study must inevitably have some consequences for the quality of training of university and graduate students who will be needed as China develops. There are very practical consequences of such a policy in such areas as advanced agricultural research and the development of high technology capabilities.

While the May 7 cadre schools may be realistic in terms of Chinese internal political priorities, they, too, pose dilemmas. If the program is carried out as we saw it at Chung Wen, then the yearly loss of special contributions by doctors, engineers, and scientists must be high. If these individuals in fact do not participate in the May 7 experience, then elitism remains.

ORGANIZING PEOPLE

It was readily apparent that social control on a large scale and in minute particulars was essential to bring about the modernization of China along the political lines of the Chinese leaders. Since all of the institutions we visited emphasized the need for community self-reliance, understanding of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and rejected material incentives as a means for insuring support and enthusiasms for difficult tasks, the emphasis had to be upon education and organization for the acceptance of policies. [Though material differences do remain between peasants, and within factories, our guides and those who briefed us emphasized that these material differences should eventually be eliminated and continually minimized.]

The means for insuring a high degree of social organization and support are through the institutions of the state and mass organizations under the leadership of the party. While the party and the state and army may dominate the Chinese political system, determine policy alternatives and the means for their implementation, there are a variety of organizations which provide links to the vast number of China's citizens outside the elite. [These institutions support and provide means for supplementing the dominant institutions. Some of these organizations are associated with residence patterns and the others are called mass organizations, of which the Women's Federation is an example.]

During our visit we visited and toured a neighborhood residence association and had an extended briefing by the vice chairman of the Peking Municipal Women's Federation. These two experiences provide an example of how the system works.

THE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION

The West Chang'an Neighborhood Association is a governmental organization covering about 1.5 kilometers of the city. It is composed of 20,000 households with a total population of about 80,000 individuals, including 14 primary schools, 7 kindergartens, 800 teachers and staff and some 10,000 students. It is managed by 12 revolutionary committees.

The West Chang'an Neighborhood Association is a governmental organization below the Peking municipal committee, county, and district committees. The neighborhood office workers—cadres—are assigned by the government and paid by the government. On the other hand, the residence committee is drawn from the residents, work is voluntary and represents, we were told, self-government in the urban areas. Each residence committee is responsible for approximately 600 households, equal to about 2,400 individuals. The residence standing committee was composed of 15 members with a chairman and two vice chairmen. In the specific residence committee we visited, one member of the committee was a retired worker and all the rest were housewives over 40. Most young women were full-time workers in factories, shops, and government units, where their responsibilities to their units did not permit them to participate in the activities of the local residential area. Thus, the committee was largely made up of women over 40 years of age.

The selection of membership follows a pattern observed elsewhere. A tentative list of names is agreed upon and then forwarded for approval to the next higher political authority. Approval was on the basis of enthusiasm and activism. We could not find out why a name might be rejected nor how often such rejection occurs.

While the committees had existed for some time, we were told that before the cultural revolution they had no office space and their activities were more limited than is the case today. In general terms the work of the committee was (1) to organize study groups, (2) to insure that each small "alley" or courtyard group—oldstyle housing in Peking revolved around courtyards; after 1949, the large houses were divided into smaller living units but the courtyard still remains the focus of those living in the house itself—hence the term courtyard association which may have 100 or 200 members—supervised children in the absence of working parents, and (3) to develop means for enhancing the livelihood of those living in the area.

These goals were translated into some interesting activities. For example, we observed a group engaged in Chinese silk painting subcontracted from a factory, a service center, a medical station and a sewing center, and a nursery. We were told that some piecework assignments were scattered throughout the area for those who needed to work at home. All these activities were supervised and coordinated by the residence committee.

Beyond these programs, the committee was responsible for periodic area cleanup and for insuring public health activities to prevent infectious diseases.

In observing these activities, we found that the women working were also middle-aged and older persons who supplemented their income by what was considered "part-time" employment. It appeared, however, that the hours spent on their work approached full time. Volunteer women in the area, together with medical workers, coordinated family planning activities. Our guides told us that the committee and its volunteers worked closely with the health stations to make certain that those women in the childbearing ages received full information about the desirability of small families and the advantages it offered to the couple. In addition, birth control pills were dispensed from these same health stations. While sterilization and abortions were possible, it seemed that primary reliance was placed upon the pill. The neighborhood committee also had an office that was responsible for security and such militia activities as were organized in the area. It appeared that while the residence committee had general responsibility, the neighborhood association was the governmental unit involved in coordinating militia activities.

Much of the housing in the area we visited was old. We were told that government committees existed to assign housing, particularly the new facilities being built, with government decisions made on the basis of the size of the family and its particular conditions. But our hosts told us that some informal trading occurred. We learned elsewhere that in some cities, couples who married at the ages recommended, namely, 23-24 for women and 25-26 for men, rather than at the legal ages of 18 for women and 20 for men, received some priority for housing assignments.

We asked about the resolution of differing views within the committees. Our guides told us that differences did occur from time to time. In those cases each side could state their case to a higher authority but we were told that "the minority is always persuaded."

We asked about the problems the committee had confronted over the history of its development. Initially, there was reluctance on the part of individuals to involve themselves in political study, to participate in group cleanup efforts and also to practice family planning. Over the years the residence committee has stressed these activities. Group study sessions were organized to explain the importance of cleanup efforts, or the advantages of family planning for the health of the couple, and their work. Undoubtedly, as years passed, Chinese women and men came to understand the expectation of their participation in political study.

The organization of the neighborhood association together with the residence committee provides Chinese leadership with the means to reach those individuals in Chinese cities not employed in factories and administrative units and shops. In addition, it provides a mechanism for insuring positive social support for government policies many of which are genuinely popular. We noted, for example, that the residence committee through close overseeing of the courtyards could make certain of the safety of children returning home after school, or could insure that health policies were carried out. The committees provided

useful and meaningful employment to retired and older citizens. It undoubtedly also serves to allow potential leaders to gain some experience in smaller units before they are moved into larger responsibilities. At the same time, the effective residence committees must curtail the privacy possible for individuals in the area. Effective operation requires a thorough knowledge of the work and activities of the citizens for whom they are responsible. The sphere of individual or family responsibility shrinks. Election to the leadership of these committees is by acclaim or consensus—no secret balloting takes place.

THE WOMEN'S FEDERATION—MODEL OF A MASS ORGANIZATION

There are also a large number of associations that maintain contact with primary citizens' groups as well as with the national political elite. In general these mass organizations are national in scale with a table of organization from the central level down to a mass membership. They are defined by some social or economic characteristic, as for example workers for the trade unions or women for the All China Women's Federation. In Communist systems they can serve to make the needs and wishes of their members known to the leadership and make the leadership decisions known to their membership. These organizations are generally open to all who share the characteristic of membership, thus enhancing the likelihood of mass contact. In addition, they have local, intermediate, and national officers and representative bodies. A number of these organizations were suspended from activities during the course of the Cultural Revolution, in part because they were accused of overly stressing the interests of their members. In the 1970's, however, the women's federation has received considerable attention in part because of its obvious role in enhancing the role of women in China.

The delegation met with Madam Hsu Kuang, vice chairman of the Peking Women's Federation, for an extended discussion about the changes in the position and role of women since 1949. Not only did we learn about Chinese efforts and programs to utilize women more fully in their society, but also about the women's federation's views of Chinese women with respect to achievements and organization. In addition to our discussions with Madam Hsu, we met representatives of the women's federation at virtually every point on our trip—at communes, factories, meetings, hospitals, and schools—giving us the opportunity to see "on the spot" development.

Chinese problems and achievements in this area of social change mirror efforts with respect to many other groups. They demonstrate the close relationship between party leadership, government policies, and self-education and change initiated by women themselves.

To enhance roles for women, emphasis is upon the close relationship between politics and social policy. At one point in our discussion a question was raised on this specific point. One member of the delegation noted that in the International Women's Year meeting in Mexico City political issues had seemed to prevent close cooperation among women of the world. Madam Hsu noted that the Chinese believe that women's problems are related to politics, class, and nationality, and this linkage remained clear throughout all our discussions.

The Chinese say that women today under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party enjoy equality with men and "have risen from being slaves to being masters of their own country" and playing an important role in building new China. They note that Chairman Mao had said that when women rose up, the revolution would succeed and they had done so throughout the history of the party. In the long march, as members of the historic Eighth Route Army, in the guerrilla operations during the Sino-Japanese War and today in the Chinese People's Liberation Army, women have made a great contribution.

According to Madam Hsu, in the old society Chinese women were not only oppressed by imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism but in addition by the authority of politics, of the clan, of religion and of their husbands. Women were exploited economically, had no right to read or to be educated (90 percent were illiterate), were discriminated against in Chinese philosophy (particularly by Confucius and Mencius), had no right to their own names nor to choose the man they married.

Since 1949, in the view of the Chinese women we met, there have been substantial changes, partially as a result of Chinese political policies and partially as a result of social emphasis within the country. This has been a two-pronged policy, namely specific Chinese laws coupled with special measures for the protection of the health, well-being and training of Chinese women.

The fundamental legislative changes that established equality in post 1949 China were the 1951 marriage laws that insisted on the free right of individuals to choose their spouses, established equal rights for both partners in the care of children, and women's use of their own names, together with monogamous marriage and equal rights to divorce. In addition, the labor insurance legislation and labor protection provisions provided safeguards for women in terms of maternity leave, conditions of employment, and provisions for child care and retirement benefits. Together with these major changes in law and the Chinese constitutional provision for equality for women, certain less formal developments had also lessened the problems of women. Thus the development of primary and middle schools, plus the increasing availability of jobs, together with the party's insistence on the hiring of women, had provided opportunities for literacy and employment. Though many of these programs existed before the cultural revolution, in its aftermath, emphasis has been placed on increasing the number of women with special skills such as doctors, and increasing the number of women in politically responsible positions.

These efforts have already begun to bear fruit. There were a number of examples cited to show the increasing role that women now play in China. In important political positions the number of women has been increasing. In the Politburo of the Communist Party there are now two women. In the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) one first vice premier and three vice chairmen are women. There are more women on the standing committee of the NPC. Of its 141 members, 42 are women. In the NPC itself, the percentages of women have been increasing: in the First NPC 10 percent. Second NPC 14 percent. Third NPC 18 percent, and Fourth NPC 22 percent. In the State

Council (the chief administrative organ) there are now two ministers (public health and hydraulic engineering).

Below the national level, at the provincial and municipal levels, the number of women leaders (as well as minorities) is increasing. In the Peking Revolutionary Committee there are three women vice chairmen, and where women in precultural revolution days constituted 25 percent of the cadres they are now 38 percent. In the judiciary in the highest court there was one vice justice who was a woman and seven women in the middle court.

In addition to the Government, changes were also taking place in other employment areas. More women are now teaching in primary and middle schools and changes are occurring at the university level as well. Currently 60 percent of the doctors are women, though fewer senior doctors are women. Fifty percent of medical students are women and 40 percent of the students at Peking university are women.

Beyond these indications of increasing employment success, the emphasis in China has been upon changing some of the conditions which limited women's participation and changing some of the remaining inequitable economic conditions. Thus, we were told the opportunities for schooling have increased, and in most places women now receive equal pay for equal work, though some problems remain in the countryside.

In addition to educational opportunities, the possibility of bringing more women into productive labor rests upon providing opportunities for child care, for basic reading skills for older women (an effort largely confined to the residence committees discussed above), and opening occupations to women which had previously been closed to them—together with an emphasis upon delayed marriage and successful family planning to permit women to complete their education, and begin their work. The social welfare legislation plus neighborhood organizations aid women to combine marriage and work by reducing demands on them for shopping, child care, and numerous household duties.

The increased skills and training available to women make their employment opportunities more varied, such as the women members of the oil drilling teams in the Ta Ching oilfields, or a woman crane operator—whom we observed in the P'eng-pu commune—or women aircraft pilots.

The Chinese women leaders were realistic about difficulties. They noted the need for special skills for women, recognized that full time work for women placed increased demands upon their husbands. They emphasized that the effort to aid women need not be divisive between husbands and wives. They said that some of the centers we had seen in the West Changan Neighborhood Association—that is, the sewing center—obviously provided advantages to working women but were not always available or adequate.

At the same time, the Chinese women pointed out differences between boys and girls which they said should be recognized. For example, they commented that though school curricula were identical for boys and girls, the afterschool activities reflected the preferences of girls and boys as well as their differing physical makeup. They said fewer women were students at China's Science and Technology Uni-

versity and were still small in number in the party (they did not provide figures or percentages). We observed furthermore, in the course of our travels, remaining social patterns that affect economic relations between men and women. There are sex-typed activities, specifically child care centers, nurseries, and kindergartens; the work groups in the countryside which we saw still were largely either men or women with few mixed groups. Certain factory work is by accident or custom or preference largely female, for example the textile factory. We do not have sufficient evidence to say whether or not the lower paying positions are largely female, but there may be financial consequences to the differing work groups, especially in agriculture.

In this changing social scene, the role of the women's federation was an interesting one and illustrative of mass organizations in general. When asked how they operated, we learned of the multifunctions of the federation. A women's federation under various names has existed since the earliest days of the party. It is under the control of the party and serves as the link between the party and women. Its tasks are first of all, to study the thought of Chairman Mao Tsetung and in small groups to raise the political consciousness of women. The task is universal whether it is practiced in the commune, factory, school or neighborhood. This means not only an educative role—also filled by the schools—but also the personal reinforcement of the communicative and administrative skills that will be useful in the society at large. The women's federation addresses itself to all women in all walks of life, where it popularizes political slogans such as "Learn from Tachai" or "Learn from Ta Ching"—the industrial model slogan—and the need for women to participate in socialist construction under these banners, but it translates these slogans into women's needs. The federation may, therefore, become a setting in which to develop confidence for those women not yet able or willing to speak out or participate in the larger world. We were told that the federation also plays an important function in helping to identify potential leaders to be recommended for further training or differing appointments. This latter function has not been examined closely. It may mean identifying young women leaders and providing the opportunity for them to enhance their skills or to move into more responsible positions of authority.

SOCIAL CONTROL

The emphasis in China, apparent throughout our visit, is upon voluntary compliance and support. In the communes, the cities, the factories, the neighborhood associations and the myriad of small groups that interface Chinese society, the emphasis is upon voluntarism and cooperation. Whenever the delegation asked questions about differences of viewpoints, the response always indicated that efforts to resolve differences focused upon persuasion. As one person in the context of such a delegation query said, "the minority is always persuaded." No doubt this emphasis of Chinese society—and other nations as well—owes much to the Chinese tradition as well as to the leadership since 1949. Though legal codes did exist in pre-1949 China, they had always been minimal in effect largely because of the instability in the society. In criminal offenses, the traditional Chinese state did intervene with quite severe sanctions, yet normal life did not require the instru-

sion of the state, nor seek it. Thus, to discuss the role of sanctions and the legal system in China we must begin with a frank acknowledgement that informal organizations, mutual discussions, and informal pressures are an important and largely effective means for dispute resolution and for control of social behavior.

Some crime, however limited, does exist in China; evil doers, often referred to as a "bad element" still exist. Though the frequency may be limited, occasional antisocial acts still occur. Ordinary crime is "a contradiction between people." Political crime is a "contradiction between the State and the enemy." If convicted, one becomes "a bad element." In these circumstances how does the system operate?

The delegation had hoped to observe a trial in Chinese courts. When we arrived, however, we were told that courts were not in session and therefore it would not be possible to observe a trial. Instead, our hosts had arranged for a discussion session in Shanghai on social and legal problems to afford us the opportunity to raise questions and issues. It was an extremely interesting meeting and illustrative of important differences in Chinese views of how behavior should be controlled.

The Chinese presentation was in two stages. They provided us with an extremely detailed description of how they dealt with two social problems—prostitution and smoking of opium—in Shanghai shortly after 1949; then they turned to the legal system itself and discussed the judicial process, selection of judges and types of sanctions ranging from neighborhood supervision to prison (prisons are "thought rehabilitation centers or camps") sentences for adults and youthful offenders. The selection of social problems as the main emphasis with a secondary discussion of legal proceedings is probably a fair appraisal of the ways in which Chinese society seems to operate. Accordingly, we report on this topic as the Chinese presented it, incorporating where appropriate the important differences with our experience.

THE CHINESE SOLUTION TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS—PROSTITUTION AND DRUGS

In many ways, learning about the Chinese solution for prostitution and drugs in the city of Shanghai was an appropriate setting. This large seacoast city had an infamous reputation in pre-1949 days. As a center of contact between the Chinese and the West, Shanghai was governed partially by Chinese but largely by three Western powers in specific sections of the city (the French, English and American sectors delimited as the outgrowth of the unequal treaty system). The city was notorious as a center of prostitution and drugs in the 20th century. The Chinese account, as was customary in most briefings, focused upon how a specific small unit, Ta Ching Lane, dealt with the problem of prostitution.

Ta Ching Lane is located opposite the largest department store in Shanghai, one familiar to most visitors to the city. The lane is part of the general residential area adjacent to Nanking Road, a section of the city covering 0.045 square kilometers, encompassing 14,000 families and a population of 51,000 people. It is now governed by nine street committees and is somewhat smaller than the West Changhan Neighborhood Association we visited in Peking. Its population is roughly equivalent to that of a large commune, but the area is, of course, an

urban one and hence densely settled. In pre-1949 days, Ta Ching Lane had a high concentration of brothels, gambling casinos and opium dens. Prostitution at that time, apparently, was licensed by the government and this lane had 24 licensed brothels. As one woman put it, "There was no difference between 'day and night' in the lane. The brothel keepers were women whose husbands were the local despots who suppressed the prostitutes."

In 1949, upon the arrival of Chinese Communist forces, measures were taken by the People's government to bring the situation under control and to end organized prostitution. The government ceased issuing licenses and passed laws prohibiting brothels, together with instituting measures to reform brothel keepers. Some indeed were reformed and handed over their old licenses; others resisted, however, and went "underground." As our hosts said, "The struggle was complicated and acute." The government apparently also mobilized the local population to realize the dangers of prostitution and, more importantly, to report instances of prostitution. This struggle continued for almost 3 years. In 1952, the government sealed all brothels, and arrested all brothel keepers and prostitutes.

The procedures followed in dealing with those arrested is illustrative of the process used throughout China for a variety of social purposes. The government held mass rallies within the various lanes, encouraging the population to criticize and repudiate the brothel keepers. Prostitutes were encouraged to go up on the stage and accuse the individual brothel keepers. The severity of the punishment for the accused differed depending upon his or her attitude. Those brothel keepers who had earlier handed in their licenses were assigned to productive labor. Those of lesser guilt, or who perhaps more easily admitted their guilt, were turned over to the alley organizations for reform under supervision. Those who were convicted of serious crimes, or who continued to deny their guilt, were sentenced to a lengthy 15-year prison term.

The policy with respect to the prostitutes was different from that applied to the brothel keepers. Prostitutes were given political education and training in productive labor that would permit them to support themselves. Since most of the prostitutes had been recruited from the rural areas, those who still had homes were returned to the countryside. Many, however, had no homes or family. They received political, social and economic training and were employed in factories, producing such items as dresses, handkerchiefs and other clothing items. Some prostitutes had men whom they wished to marry. They were usually allowed to do so. Since the early 1950's, the Chinese said, the problem of prostitution no longer existed, and those who entered into productive labor experienced no discrimination.

In contemporary China, we were told, prostitution, though extremely rare, does remain a crime and is a matter for resolution by the social organizations. The criminal, however, in prostitution cases is only the woman—not the client. Cases of adultery do occasionally still occur. In general, this will be handled through criticism and repudiation of the individual by the unit or small group. Repeated cases might result in labor reform, the sentence based upon the seriousness of the offense. Emphasis is now upon preventative work through

lectures to the young about the importance of maintaining a revolutionary tradition and the new moral code of conduct.

The procedure for bringing trafficking in and smoking of opium under control was similar in many respects to the discussion of prostitution. After 1949, the People's government passed a series of laws prohibiting the importation, manufacture, and marketing of opium and the running of opium dens. "Some recognized that the proletariat were in power and removed themselves from these activities." Others went underground. By 1952, the People's government had adopted broader measures for the comprehensive prohibition of opium smoking and trafficking. These policies were implemented by decentralized measures from the city down to the district, subdistrict and street and alley organizations. In meetings the masses were called upon to name all those involved in either smoking or traffic. Sentences were determined on the basis of the severity of the crime as well as the outlook and characteristics of the individual. Leniency was extended to those who acknowledged their fault and repented. Some who were denounced for serious crimes but showed a better attitude received a lighter penalty, while those with serious crimes who did not admit their guilt received serious punishment.

In the above accounts, it should be clear that, with respect to severe social problems that confronted the Chinese Communist leadership, the emphasis was upon local units leading the attack on those criticized; and distinctions were made among all culprits, spotlighting serious offenders who then became the focus of local anger and of demands for punishment.

DISPUTES AND PUNISHMENT

The cases which come before Chinese courts are both civil and criminal. The nature of civil cases has changed somewhat since 1949. In years past, the disputes were largely about ownership of land, unpaid debts and property rights. Today most disputes involve families, marriage, and neighborhood difficulties. These disputes, the Chinese said, are examples of contradictions within the people and because of attention given to them at the grassroots level of organization only occasionally reach the court at all. Some criminal cases arise since criminals do exist, and have to be punished, but those who were forced or intimidated into criminal acts or have substantially cooperated with the investigation and revealed all of their knowledge about the event should be treated more lightly.

The punishments meted out to offenders should be noted carefully. In our discussions, our Chinese hosts pointed out that one level of sanction is "supervision of the masses." Individuals who are designated as a "bad element" lose their political rights and their activities are closely watched. There is no doubt that some "bad elements" derived their status from involvement in the civil war, such as the holding of certain ranks in the Kuomintang army, or from activities in the pre-1949 period, but the term was and is used for antisocial behavior, as for example those involved in opium trafficking.

The individual under the "supervision of the masses" cannot move without explicit permission and is required to report once a week to

a small group designed by the local unit, but the individual is not penalized, we were told, with respect to his employment. We were told that the individual is not specifically assigned more difficult productive labor. The group reports weekly on the progress of the individual, with a 6-month summing up report and a yearly general summary. The group, if it observes good conduct and progress in ideological remolding, can recommend that the title of "bad element" be removed. Individuals may associate with the "bad element," perhaps help in his remolding, and also report if he violates the expected code of conduct.

The more serious sanction, for certain crimes or classes of individuals, is reform through physical labor. The operation of the system of reform through physical labor was of considerable interest. Although our hosts described the prison system in some detail, they began by noting that, with respect to all acts that run counter to expected behavior, the emphasis is upon giving the individual a "way out." In cases of prison reform through physical labor, the Chinese told us that these cases were very limited for adults and even more so for youthful offenders, and that the rate of recidivism was extremely low—estimated at around 1 percent.

With respect to the sentences meted out, the Chinese distinguished between those whose crimes were determined to reflect "contradictions within the people" and those reflecting "contradictions between the enemies and the people." The distinction is of some importance because the crimes designated as reflecting contradictions between the people and the enemy carried sentences almost twice the length of those reflecting contradictions within the people. Most political cases are "contradictions between the enemy and the people." The distinction has implications outside of the determination of legal penalties and underpins many of the Chinese views about the way that change can occur.

Briefly, the difference reflects the Chinese leadership's view that some political conflict and styles and interests reflect actual social conditions. Those contradictions within the people exist for various reasons, ranging from inadequate education and understanding of Maoism to human frailty or incomplete development of socialist institutions. They are to be resolved by discussion, education, and a more lenient view of the need for punishment through labor reform. The antagonistic ones are between the people and their enemies, and, therefore, to be resolved through the exercise of dictatorship, force, and denial of political rights.

Once a determination has been made about the sentence, the individual is given work according to his physical capability and its relationship to ideological reform. The priority is first on reform and second on production. The intent, however, is to provide the individual with some capability of supporting himself after the sentence is complete.

The prisoner serves something of an "indeterminate" sentence. Though a term is set, the prison organization can recommend to the court that the sentence be reduced or, in case of violations of prison regulations, can recommend its increase. A large number of the prisoners when released also have the title of "bad element" removed, and political rights are restored. (An example cited was two groups of

Chinese Nationalist officials released from prison in 1975.) While in prison, we were told, if the prisoner's family has no means of support, the family will be subsidized. It appears that the prisoner's status was not a sufficient reason to permit divorce by a spouse. The Chinese told us that permission for a divorce would need to take into account the prisoner's situation and the consequences of a divorce on his reform.

Regulations within prisons appeared to be rather simple. The prisoner was entitled to write two letters a month, but there was no limit on the number he could receive. Medical care was provided by the state without charge. Relatives could visit once a month. The right to write, receive letters, or visit could be withdrawn if the prisoner violated prison regulations. The prisoner could be quarantined for a period no longer than 1 week, but only upon the explicit approval of the leadership unit in the prison.

Provisions for youth offenders appeared to differ somewhat. Our hosts indicated that prison sentences for youth were extremely rare. Youthful offenders were placed in separate facilities. Their programs were composed of half study and half work with emphasis largely upon education. They are frequently released ahead of time as rehabilitation is judged to have occurred and virtually never is prison followed by mass supervision. We were not allowed to visit any prison facility.

THE JUDGES AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

The judicial process and the role of the judges in the Chinese judicial process differs in a number of important ways from those with which we are familiar. It was interesting, therefore, to see how they place the legal institutions and their judicial system in the context of the building of a Socialist state.

In the Chinese view, the People's court is an important organ for exercising the right of power of trial and an important institution of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In their view, when China is still moving from capitalism to socialism there will still be class struggle. In this period, we were told, the functions of the court should be strengthened and not weakened.

The Chinese court structure is composed of a Supreme Court responsible for organizing trials as well as certain educational functions, together with courts at the provincial and municipal levels. There is (1) a high court, (2) a district court—prefecture—at the intermediate level covering certain special administrative areas, or counties, together with (3) several county courts. In Shanghai, this system has been gradually developed since 1949 into a high court, an intermediate court and 10 county courts. All the People's courts have three functions: (1) To punish all criminal violations of law; (2) to handle correctly civil disputes; and (3) to carry on education and impart knowledge on the jurisdiction of law.

The Chinese system is for each case to have two trials with the final one determinative. After the first trial, the defendant is entitled to appeal to the intermediate court, but there is no formal appeal after the second trial. If there continues to be difficulty with the verdict, the defendant can appeal to the Central Committee of the Communist Party—a right afforded all individuals by the 1975 Constitution.

All trials are to be public except when private matters or state secrets are involved. In all trials the defendant can demand a person to aid in his defense, or defend himself. When the court finds it necessary, it can appoint someone to defend him.

The Chinese told us that their policy is to stress proof and not rely mainly on oral testimony. The individual may ask the state for witnesses but cannot compel their presence; there may be written testimony. Since most trials today take place in the unit where the crime occurred, the witnesses are already present and, if one does not wish to testify, another may be found. Considerable emphasis is placed upon material proof of the offense.

The Chinese gave us a case example of the current system in operation. They said that in 1975 a theft occurred in the Shanghai railroad administration bureau. Materials for transport were being stolen in a freight transportation center, where redirection of freight occurs. The theft was discovered and reported to the public security bureau. Representatives were sent to investigate and discovered the worker who had been doing it. The individual was arrested and an extensive investigation then occurred by the court. The court came to the workshop and "relied upon the party and the masses there in the workshop." The case was tried in the workshop. In the course of the trial, it was discovered that not only did the worker steal but he also corrupted others. Eight youths came to the platform to accuse the man. There was public display of the materials stolen. In the face of the criticism, testimony and proof, the individual admitted his guilt in court.

In this process it should be noted that two emphases emerged. The Chinese said that since the cultural revolution, the court system had adopted two slogans—"going out" and "coming in." The going out referred to carrying on trials in the particular unit where the incident or crime occurred rather than in some remote courtroom. Second, "coming in" meant bringing the masses and the party directly into the process rather than keeping them remote from the judicial process. By bringing the representatives of the workers and masses into the process, the Chinese said the quality of the work had improved, because the masses, generally speaking, are correct.

The selection of judges reflected a general emphasis on a revolutionary background and understanding. The Chinese said that judges were normally drawn from the workers, peasants or army people who understood the revolutionary line, the importance of class struggle and had a high cultural—referring to their educational background—level. They became judges only after a period of actual practice in the courts. Some came to this work after short training sessions in law schools, others were from universities or special law schools, but all needed to have practice. This was especially important because some had been educated under the bourgeois educational line. Individuals were appointed by the revolutionary committee of the identical level of organization.

Decisions involve collective judgment. When the trial took place, the judges, of course, consulted with the masses. Each judge sought the view of the standing committee of the unit, as well as the party committee. The individual judge then formed a decision which was brought to the panel of judges of the court for discussion and then submitted to the court leadership.

The judicial process in China shows a consistency in its working, given the assumptions about the nature of society in the movement toward socialism. It appears to be relatively informal in its operations. While incidence of petty theft may occur more frequently than appears, the incidents appear to be handled at the local level and probably do not generally reach the legal system. The descriptions of the movements to abolish prostitution and opium smoking, both in form and descriptive language, seemed similar to procedures that are used throughout the system to insure support and approved social conduct. The emphasis upon persuasion and education together with the pervasive social organization limits the legal system's operation to cases that are too serious to be resolved at the local level in terms of their consequences. Thus, the example of theft in the railway transfer center obviously had implications that made it important to explore the problem. Marriage disputes or those between neighborhoods are screened through successive layers of social organizations before reaching the degree of formality implied in judicial proceedings.

In the actual resolution of disputes or of criminal proceedings however, the emphasis is not upon the adversary relationship as found in many American proceedings. In criminal cases, the investigations and operations may well be to "provide" a way out, but there was no emphasis on the presumed innocence of the accused. In a society which places such emphasis upon class background and struggle, such differences might be understandable, but it remains the fact that legal activities are not, apparently, conducted on the basis of highly detailed procedural safeguards for the individual. Since the Chinese see the court as an instrument for the exercise of the dictatorship of the proletariat, then it would be a contradiction for it also to operate as the defense of the individual. Legal sanctions remain a last resort in China where so much local social pressure and discussion are available to insure appropriate action. This is not to deny the importance of legal sanctions, but to recognize that they indeed might be used less frequently.

The safeguards with respect to witnesses, appeals, and procedures do not constitute an important aspect of the system in China. Instead, though some of those procedures do exist, they are not emphasized as a protection for the individual. In fact, regard for the individual is contrary to the system, which describes individualism as "a filthy idea." Flexibility in the system with respect to sentences and penal operations may well operate to provide a less harsh series of correctional institutions. If Chinese recidivism rates approach the 1 percent quoted us, they may well indeed have discovered how to organize their society in such a way as to forestall the need for much of the criminal anti-social behavior found in most Western countries. In that event however, it is essential to keep in mind that the solution involves the whole society and not just the formal sanctions of the legal system.

LEADERSHIP AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

On the day of our departure, January 8, 1976, Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, died.

[The official announcement of his death is included as appendix 3, p. 56.] The shock and grief of our hosts—many of whom had worked with Premier Chou—together with the beginnings of the national period of mourning made our departure from China even sadder than might have been the case. In reading the text of the funeral announcement one saw reflections of the 20th century history of the nation and of its ruling Communist Party. It made us pause to reflect even more upon the problems that confront China and the men and women who would have to make difficult choices in the years ahead.

The transition of leadership in any society is a difficult matter. For the people of China, the turbulence and human waste that marked the years 1937-49 (and 1966-69 during the Cultural Revolution) seemed largely to end with the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the consolidation of power by the Communist Party. Though there is ample evidence in the years since then, much of it explicitly described to us by our Chinese hosts, of the continuing struggles between different factions of the nation about appropriate policies to be followed the active political leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the administrative capabilities of Premier Chou afforded some measure of continuity in the face of competing pressures. The death of Premier Chou, whose ill health had been well known, evidenced the inexorable tide of generational change.

It is true, of course, that the Chinese have provided formal means for the appointment of successors. In an effort to ease the transfer of authority, as recently as January 1975, Chinese constitutional provisions were adopted to make explicit the procedures for succession. But in China, as elsewhere, events and circumstances often make such provisions less satisfactory than they might have seemed when adopted. The determination to maintain the ideological commitment expressed by Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party together with the inevitable storms and controversies—which we have highlighted in this report—make the possibility, though not the certainty of leadership turmoil a question to be considered.

Congressional visitors before us have noted the importance of the Communist Party in the decisionmaking process of China. Our experience reaffirms the centrality of the party's role. As a congressional delegation we naturally met with representatives of the Chinese government whether at the central, provincial, or local level. Wherever we went, individuals who played key roles, were party members. In the communes, at the May 7th cadre schools, in the women's organizations, the responsible men and women were almost always members of the party. The party member in China serves the linchpin function at all levels of the society.

The growth in the Communist Party since its establishment in 1921 has been enormous. Yet it remains a very small segment of the population, approximately 28 million members among a population of more than 700 million people. There was no information available to us about the distribution of party members throughout the country. Whenever we visited a specific unit, we would inquire about the party membership of individuals and our hosts were quite straightforward in telling us who were party members. But although it was relatively easy to determine on a microlevel membership in the party we were

unable to gather comparable data for provincial units, membership in the mass organization. In general, therefore our experience mirrors that of other delegations that macrodata is more difficult to acquire. We do not attribute this to a lack of candidness on the part of our hosts but rather as a reflection of the priorities in statistical reporting in China and the very likely fact that local party members were not necessarily in a position to provide data on party membership in the large units of which they were a small part.

The capacity of this small group to exercise such decisive authority derives from the hierachical organization of China which we have described above. Whether the topic is university selection, neighborhood committee plans or any of the myriad of ongoing policy decisions taken throughout Chinese life, the fact that higher authorities, or units, review decisions, that representative lists for election are submitted for review by the higher level authority makes it possible for the Chinese Communist Party to intervene on a selective basis within the society. The various representative congresses in Chinese society meet infrequently and their standing committee makes what necessary ongoing decisions must be faced. It appeared that the standing committee, the revolutionary committees, and most certainly highest levels of governmental responsibility are dominated by the party.

The explicit recognition of the importance of the party in the life of China's leadership is overtly seen in the funeral announcement of Chou En-lai where his party positions and memberships precede his governmental titles. We highlight this fact in our report to reemphasize that understanding of the country and its future cannot be divorced from considerations about the party and its vitality and strength. The success or failure of Chinese modernization efforts, the maintenance of current domestic and international priorities, is intimately linked not only to substantive arguments that support different policy options but also to the new generation of party members who are now moving to take positions of leadership in China.

APPENDIX 1

ITINERARY OF CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Saturday, December 27, 1975

8:00 a.m.—Depart Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., Special Mission Aircraft. Seen off by Ambassador Han Hsu and other members of the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China.
4:00 p.m.—Arrive Hickam Air Force Base, Oahu, Hawaii.
5:30 p.m.—7:00 p.m.—Briefing by Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief, Pacific.
7:00 p.m.—Reception by Admiral and Mrs. Gayler.
Overnight—Sheraton Waikiki Hotel.

Sunday, December 28, 1975

8:00 a.m.—Depart Hawaii, Special Mission Aircraft.
2:00 p.m.—Arrive Guam Air Force Base refueling stop. Cross International Dateline.

Monday, December 29, 1975

3:00 p.m.—Arrive Tokyo Haneda International Airport. Met by Mr. William Breer of the U.S. Embassy.
6:30 p.m.—Reception by Ambassador and Mrs. Hodgson for Congressional Delegation and Japanese Women Diet Members and leaders in various fields.
Overnight—Okura Hotel.

Tuesday, December 30, 1975

8:30 a.m.—Depart Tokyo Haneda International Airport by Special Mission Aircraft.
10:30 a.m.—Arrive Shanghai Airport, welcomed by members of the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs (CPIFA).
11:00 a.m.—2:30 p.m.—Brief car tour of Shanghai; lunch at Shanghai People's Mansions.
2:30 p.m.—Departure by Chinese Commercial Aircraft for Peking.
4:00 p.m.—Arrive Peking. Airport welcome by members of CPIFA.
6:30 p.m.—Banquet in honor of the Congressional Delegation by CPIFA at the Peking Hotel.

In addition to members of the Delegation and Acting Chief Harry Thayer of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, guests in attendance were:

Mr. Chou Chiu-yeh, Vice-president, CPIFA
Mrs. Kang Tai-sha, Vice-secretary General, CPIFA
Mr. Fan Kuo-hsiang, Vice-division Chief, CPIFA
Mr. Chen Wan-chen, Staff Member, CPIFA
Mr. Tu Chi-wen, Staff Member, CPIFA
Mrs. Ku Ke-ping, Staff Member, CPIFA
Mrs. Chu Yu, Staff Member, CPIFA
Mr. Hua Chun-doh, Staff Member, CPIFA
Mr. Shen Chih-huan, Staff Member, CPIFA
Mr. Wang Lien, Staff Member, CPIFA
Mr. Chiu Pe-teh, Staff Member, CPIFA
Mr. Ling Kuang-jung, Staff Member, CPIFA
Mrs. Yeh Yun-ming, Staff Member, CPIFA

Mr. Huang Chen, Chief of the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China, Washington, D.C.
 Miss Wang Hai-jung, Vice-minister Foreign Ministry
 Miss Tang Wen-sheng, Vice-director, Department in Charge of American and Oceanian Affairs, Foreign Ministry
 Mr. Ting Yuan-hung, Division Chief, Department in Charge of American and Oceanian Affairs, Foreign Ministry
 Mrs. Chu Lin
 Mr. Chao Chi-hua, Vice Division Chief, Department in Charge of American and Oceanian Affairs, Foreign Ministry
 Mr. Fang Sung-hsueh, Vice Division Chief, Information Department, Foreign Ministry
 Mrs. Chao Chia, Staff Member, Department in Charge of American and Oceanian Affairs, Foreign Ministry
 Mr. Liu Ju-tsai, Staff Member, Information Department, Foreign Ministry
 Miss Lin Chiao-chih, Member, Standing Committee of the 4th National People's Congress; Head, Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the Capital Hospital
 Mrs. Sheng Li-hua, Deputy to the 4th National People's Congress; Leading Member, General Office of the Education Ministry.
 Mr. Huang Yu-lin, Staff Member of the Foreign Affairs Department, Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
 Mr. Liu Hsiang-wen, Leading Member, Foreign Affairs Department, Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee
 Mrs. Hsu Kuang, Vice-chairman, Peking Municipal Women's Association
 Mrs. Kuei Mei-yun, Vice-chairman, Trade Union of No. 2 State Cotton Mill
 Mrs. Li Feng-luan, Chairman, Women's Association of the Sino-Albanian Friendship People's Commune
 Miss Tu Pao-jung, Girl Cobbler, Shoe Workshop of Chung-wen Municipal District
 Mrs. Yu Hsiao-fang, teacher as well as vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee of No. 32 Middle School of the West Municipal District
 Mrs. Hsu Chung-chi, Chairman, Fengsheng Neighborhood Revolutionary Committee
 Mrs. Ku Feng, Staff Member, Peking Women's Association
 Mr. Chu Hung-teh, Security Office
 Mrs. Chang Meng-yi, Reporter, Hsinhua News Agency
 Mrs. Wang Ching-ying, Photographer, Hsinhua News Agency
 Mrs. Chen Huan, Radio Peking
 Mr. Sun Yung-fu, Assistant to TV
 Mr. Yen Li-chih, Assistant to TV

Overnight—Through stay at Peking Hotel, Peking

Wednesday, December 31, 1975

8:30 a.m.—12:00—Visit to West Chang'an Neighborhood Association.
 12:00—1:30 p.m.—Lunch with members of the American Liaison Office, hosted by Acting Chief Harry Thayer.
 3:00 p.m.—5:45 p.m.—Meeting with People's Republic of China Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua; also present, Acting Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Harry Thayer.

Thursday, January 1, 1976

9:30 a.m.—12:00—Meeting with Mme. Hsu Kuang, Vice-chairman of the Peking Municipal Women's Association, together with other representatives of the Association, discussing the changing role of women in China since 1947.
 1:30 p.m.—5:00 p.m.—Outing to the Great Wall.

Evening—Film Show, "Protecting the Giant Panda" and "Chinese Climbing of Everest."

Friday, January 2, 1976

10:00 a.m.—12:45 p.m.—Meeting with Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. Also present, Mme. Li Su-wen, Vice chairman, National People's Congress.

12:45 p.m.-2:00 p.m.—Lunch at the Great Hall of the People, hosted by Mme. Li Su-wen.

2:00 p.m.-6:00 p.m.—Visit to Chung Wen District May 7th Cadre School.

Saturday, January 3, 1976

9:00 a.m.-12:00—Visit to Central Institute of Nationalities (a college to train national minority cadres).

2:00 p.m.-5:00 p.m.—Visit to former Imperial Palace, archeological exhibition, air defense tunnel.

Evening—Delegation Return banquet for Chinese friends at Peking Duck Restaurant (guest list same as p. 45), plus Mme. Li Su-wen.

Sunday, January 4, 1976

9:00 a.m.-12:00—Trip by air from Peking to Chengtu, Szechuan via Chinese Foreign Ministry aircraft.

12:00—Welcome at Chengtu Airport.

1:30 p.m.-5:30 p.m.—Visit to Tien Yuan Commune “Tachai” agricultural brigade including a primary school run by the brigade, visit to a Buddhist temple in Chengtu.

7:00 p.m.-7:45 p.m.—Meeting with Hsu Chih, Vice-chairman, Szechuan Revolutionary Committee.

7:45 p.m.-9:30 p.m.—Musical Soiree.

Overnights—Tung Fang Hotel throughout stay in Chengtu

Monday, January 5, 1976

8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.—Day-long visit to Tukiangyen irrigation system in Hsientu County including the Temple of the Two Kings and tour of a deer farm.

7:00 p.m.-9:00 p.m.—Tour of downtown Chengtu area.

Tuesday, January 6, 1976

9:00 a.m.-10:45 a.m.—Trip by air from Chengtu to Kweilin in Kwangsi Autonomous Region via Chinese Foreign Ministry Aircraft.

11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m.—Visit to Kweilin Silk Spinning Factory.

1:30 p.m.-5:00 p.m.—Briefing on Chinese efforts to restore historical and scenic sites. Tour of Reed Flute Cave and Piled Festoon Hill.

Evening—Movie: “New Kweilin.”

Overnight—At Kweilin Guest House.

Wednesday, January 7, 1976

8:30 a.m.-10:30 a.m.—Trip from Kweilin to Shanghai via Chinese Foreign Ministry aircraft.

11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m.—Tour of Shanghai Industrial products in Shanghai Exhibition Hall.

2:30 p.m.-5:45 p.m.—Two programs:

Visit to P'u-tou District Children's Palace, or

Discussion of Chinese Social & Legal Problems and the legal system.

Evening—Shanghai Philharmonic Concert.

Overnights—Throughout stay in Shanghai at Chin Chiang Hotel.

Thursday, January 8, 1976

9:00 a.m.-12:00—Two Programs:

Visit to Pen-p'u Commune, or

Visit to Shanghai Museum.

1:30 p.m.-5:00 p.m.—Visit to No. 1 Middle School affiliated with Shanghai Teacher Training College.

Evening—Farewell banquet for Delegation hosted by Mme. Vice-Chairman, Shanghai Revolutionary Committee.

Friday, January 9, 1976

9:00 a.m.-12:00—Two Programs:

Visit to Hsin Hua Hospital, or

Visit to Shanghai Electrical Machinery Factory.

4:00 p.m.—Depart Shanghai by Special Mission jet aircraft. Cross International Dateline.

11:00 p.m.—Depart Hickam Air Force Base, Oahu, Hawaii.

Saturday, January 10, 1976

4:00 p.m.—Arrive Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

APPENDIX 2

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ON FEBRUARY 28, 1972, FOLLOWING PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S VISIT

[From the Peking Review, No. 9, Mar. 3, 1972]

The Chinese and U.S. sides reached agreement on a joint communique on February 27 in Shanghai. Full text of the communique is as follows:

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—that has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese People. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an inde-

pendent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace; just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Viet Nam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the people of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
- neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long

been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

APPENDIX 3

COMRADE CHOU EN-LAI PASSES AWAY

[From the Peking Review, Jan. 16, 1976]

(Obituary Notice Issued by C.P.C. Central Committee, N.P.C. Standing Committee and State Council)

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council of the People's Republic of China announce with extreme grief: Comrade Chou En-lai, Member of the C.P.C. Central Committee, Member of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee, Vice-Chairman of the C.P.C. Central Committee, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, died of cancer at 09:57 hours on January 8, 1976, in Peking at the age of 78.

Comrade Chou En-lai was a fine member of the Communist Party of China, a great proletarian revolutionary of the Chinese people, a loyal revolutionary fighter of the Chinese people and an outstanding, long-tested leader of the Party and the state.

Since Comrade Chou En-lai fell ill in 1972, he had been given meticulous, many-sided treatment by medical personnel under the constant and affectionate attention of our great leader Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee. He persevered in work all the time and waged a tenacious struggle against the illness. Owing to the worsening of his conditions despite all treatment, Comrade Chou En-lai, the great fighter of the Chinese people, finally departed from us. His death is a gigantic loss to our Party, our army and the people of our country, to the cause of China's socialist revolution and construction, to the international cause of opposing imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, as well as to the cause of the international communist movement.

Loyal to the Party and the people, Comrade Chou En-lai fought heroically and with utter devotion for the implementation of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and for the victory of the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and the cause of communism, to which he selflessly dedicated all his energies throughout his life. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao, Comrade Chou En-lai made indelible contributions and performed immortal services to building and developing the Marxist Communist Party of China, to building and developing our invincible people's army, to the victory of the new-democratic revolution and the founding of socialist New China, to consolidating the great unity of the people of all nationalities led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants and developing the revolutionary united front, to the struggle for the victory of the cause of socialist revolution and construction, the victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, and the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat of our country, to strengthening the unity of the international revolutionary forces and to the struggle against imperialism, social-imperialism and modern revisionism, and thus won the wholehearted love, respect and admiration of the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country.

The life of Comrade Chou En-lai was one of glorious fighting for the cause of communism; it was a life of persevering in continuing the revolution.

The news of Comrade Chou En-lai's death will arouse deep grief in the hearts of our people. We must turn our grief into strength. The whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country should learn from Comrade Chou En-lai's proletarian revolutionary spirit and his noble revolutionary qualities

and, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, unite as one, take class struggle as the key link, adhere to the Party's basic line, persevere in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, uphold proletarian internationalism, consolidate and develop the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and strive to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, combat and prevent revisionism, build China into a powerful modern socialist country and win victory for the cause of communism.

Eternal glory to Comrade Chou En-lai, great proletarian revolutionary of the Chinese people and outstanding communist fighter.

APPENDIX 4

HOW TACHAI BUILDS UP A SOCIALIST COUNTRYSIDE

[From the China Reconstructs, November 1974]

(By Kuo Feng-Lien, Secretary of the Communist Party Branch of Tachai production brigade)

Visitors to Tachai production brigade in Shansi province like to climb Tiger Head Hill for a bird's eye view of our land and village. They see staircase after staircase of green terraced fields held on the slopes with stone walls. A canal winding around the mountains and an electric pumping station guarantee water for fields which grow more than 7.5 tons per grain per hectare. Hoppers running on five aerial cables lift manure up to the terraces and bring quarried stone down for construction.

At the foot of the mountain is our village, its street flanked by a supply-and-marketing co-op, credit co-op, restaurant, bookstore and post office. At the end of the street are our homes—rows of houses, cave-style or brick-and-tile, built on steps cut into the hillside with fruit trees growing in front of them. We draw water from taps in front of our houses and all homes have electric lights. Our 80 families—about 400 people—have a seven-grade school, clinic, nursery-kindergarten and recreation club within walking distance.

Right next to our homes, though, behind a big willow tree, we have kept several mud cave-dwellings. We have preserved them because we don't want our young people to forget what the old Tachai was like. We lived in low, damp caves like these before liberation, and the landlord often tied peasants to the willow and beat them.

In those days the village's 53 hectares of land lay in 4,000 tiny plots scattered over badly eroded slopes and ravines. Most of this was owned by one landlord and three rich peasants. The forty poor and lower-middle peasant families were either their tenants or hired hands. All year long they worried about paying the rent and exorbitant interest on the debts they owed. There was no energy left to try to get better harvests. If they got 50 kilograms of grain on a small piece of land 20×30 meters, it was considered a good year.

How did the old Tachai change into today's Tachai? Chen Yung-kuei, our old Party branch secretary, says it was because "we work to revolutionize people's thinking". This is our first task in everything we do. Peasants armed with Mao Tsetung Thought work harder to build socialism. Changes in our thinking translate into changes in our land, our harvests and our village.

BUCKING THE CAPITALIST TREND

Chairman Mao says, "Socialist society covers a considerably long historical period. In the historical period of socialism, there are still classes, class contradictions and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, and there is the danger of capitalist restoration. We must recognize the protracted and complex nature of this struggle. We must heighten our vigilance. We must conduct socialist education. We must correctly understand and handle class contradictions and class struggle, distinguish the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy from those among the people and handle them correctly. Otherwise a socialist country like ours will turn into its opposite and degenerate, and a capitalist restoration will take place. From now on we must remind ourselves of this every year, every month and every day so that we can retain a rather sober understanding of this problem and have a Marxist-Leninist line."

This is the Party's basic line during the socialist period. Our Tachai Party branch constantly educates its leaders and the brigade members with this concept, urging them to keep to the socialist road in class struggle.

Tachai was liberated in 1945. The next year the peasants received land in the land reform. Chairman Mao had called on everyone to get organized and Chen Yung-Kuei and some poor and lower-middle peasants formed a mutual-aid team. In 1952 Chen went to the county Party committee and applied to form a semi-socialist farming cooperative in which the land would be pooled. But for a year the committee withheld its approval.

Impatient with the delay, the Tachai Party branch got the poor and lower-middle peasants together and discussed Chairman Mao's speech, "Get Organized!", particularly this: "Among the peasant masses a system of individual economy has prevailed for thousands of years, with each family or household forming a productive unit. This scattered, individual form of production is the economic foundation of feudal rule and keeps the peasants in perpetual poverty. The only way to change it is gradual collectivization, and the only way to bring about collectivization, according to Lenin, is through cooperatives."

They were sure that a cooperative was the right step to take next. What they didn't know was that the influence of Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line was causing the county Party committee to put off its approval. Liu had been against agricultural collectivization since the first mutual-aid teams appeared. He was for an individual economy and "giving a free hand to hiring labor". He insisted on "a policy to preserve the rich-peasant economy". He even said, "Exploitation should be welcomed." Later he was to order the agricultural cooperatives disbanded on a large scale.

The Tachai Party branch kept insisting on forming a cooperative. Finally in 1953 the county Party committee approved—but limited it to 30 households. Thirty households! We already had 49 in mutual-aid teams. The Party branch decided to ignore the limit and go ahead with all 49. That year the new co-op brought in a bumper harvest of 1.8 tons per hectare—more than twice what the individual farmers got. More households joined.

After two years we took another step forward in collectivization and advanced to a fully socialist co-op. Our land became collectively owned, individuals' draught animals and farm tools were bought by the co-op.

In 1958 an even bigger and stronger form of collective economy, the people's commune, was formed in China's countryside. Tachai became a production brigade in one of them. We worked even harder to improve production and that year reaped an average of four tons per hectare, five times more than when we had farmed individually.

Again, Liu Shao-chi was dead set against the people's communes. When drought and flood hit most of the country in 1959–61, he used these difficulties as a good opportunity to break up the communes. With his encouragement, capitalist trends appeared in the countryside that seriously hurt the socialist economy—free markets, the extension of private plots, the increase of small enterprises responsible for their own profit and loss, and harvest quotas based on individual households. Lin Piao also supported fixing quotas on individual households.

It was a critical time. The Tachai Party branch got the brigade members together to discuss Chairman Mao's statement that "only socialism can save China". They recalled the bitter life of the old society, analyzed the capitalist trend in the countryside and talked about the superiority of socialist collectivization.

During these three hard years, the Tachai people kept firmly to the socialist road. They loaned several dozen tons of their own reserve grain to other brigades in trouble. At the same time they fought the crippling results of bad weather, won good harvests and were even able to sell their surplus grain to the state in all three years. Tachai's stubborn defense of socialism inspired the poor and lower-middle peasants of the other brigades to struggle against capitalist trends in their own areas.

In the autumn of 1962 Chairman Mao, at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, sharply criticized Liu Shao-chi's right opportunist line and warned the nation, "Never forget class struggle." In 1964 he pointed out, "In agriculture, learn from Tachai."

A movement started by Chairman Mao to educate the peasants in socialist thinking was already under way in the countryside. A Liu Shao-chi man in the Shensi province leadership sent a work team to Tachai under the pretext of helping with socialist education. Instead, they tried to frame its leaders on false charges, claiming they had reported higher harvest figures than the brigade had actually reaped. The work team spent days weighing both stored and distributed grain. The figures were accurate to the kilogram.

Then the Tachai Party branch and the poor and lower-middle peasants held meetings in which they discussed right and wrong in the light of Chairman Mao's ideas on class struggle. They came out of the meetings more confident than ever that they were on the correct road. They told the work team, "You're here to wreck our brigade, not do revolutionary work." More and more isolated, the work team finally quietly withdrew.

In 1965 Chairman Mao specifically named the target of the socialist education campaign in the countryside: "Those persons in authority in the Party taking the capitalist road." The target was the same in the cultural revolution that followed. In the cultural revolution and in the present movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, we have settled accounts with Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and their followers, repudiating their counter-revolutionary revisionist line and their conspiracy to restore capitalism.

WITH OUR OWN HANDS

The Tachai Party branch also teaches the brigade members how to use Mao Tsetung Thought in the struggle for production. It encourages us to develop production through self-reliance.

"We cannot lean on others when we make revolution," Chen Yung-kuei often tells us. "We can build a new Tachai only by relying on our own will and our own hands."

When we first formed our co-op in 1953 we drew up a ten-year water and soil conservation plan which included basic improvement of our land. We would turn the slopes into terraced fields, build fields in the ravines and plant trees on the mountains. We were less than 300 people—with only 50 able-bodied men and women. We had only hoes and shoulder poles. Transform the harsh pattern of nature? It seemed an unequal struggle, but we accepted the challenge.

In the winter of 1955 we went to work on Wolves' Den, a sharply-sloping ravine 1.5 kilometers long and 6.6 meters wide. By spring we had turned it into terraced fields. That summer a rainstorm swept it all away. We built the terraced fields all over again the following winter. Again mountain torrents washed everything away.

In the winter of 1957 our Party branch led us to Wolves' Den for the third time. This time we increased the number of terraces, curved the retaining walls against the torrents and made them wider at the base. There were 44 walls built with 300-kg. blocks of stone which we quarried in the mountains and carried down with shoulder poles. We filled these terraces with thousands of cubic meters of soil. It took us 27 days in the piercing cold, but the hard work paid off. The walls have withstood many mountain floods since.

In ten years and 250,000 workdays we built 200 stone walls and linked up separate plots. We spread soil at least a foot deep in the terraces, deep-plowed it and built it up with manure and compost. With water, fertilizer and the soil safely held in, our terraced fields gave us more than 5 tons per hectare in 1962.

Then the next summer we had the biggest flood in a hundred years. Driving rains began in early August and did not let up for seven days. Water crashed down through the ravines, destroyed most of our terraced fields, flattened the crops and wrecked all but two of our houses.

As soon as the rain stopped the Party branch called a general meeting. Chen Yung-kuei stood up and proposed reconstruction through self-reliance. Together with the members he reviewed our ten-year plan and how we had finished it by relying on our own efforts.

"There will always be difficulties in building socialism," he said. "If we hold out our hands to the state for help now, we will be setting a bad example for the young people. We'll be encouraging them to ask the state for help every time they are in difficulty. What kind of successors will we be bringing up to carry on the cause of the proletariat?"

The state did send us relief—money, winter clothing, medicine. Three times it came, three times we sent it back. A few bad elements in the brigade called us fools. But when these enemies said we were wrong we knew we were right.

We went ahead to rebuild our land and homes. In the daytime we repaired the fields, made compost, fired bricks. At night we rebuilt our wrecked homes by the light of gas lamps. The winter of 1963 was very cold. One day we were rebuilding fields in a ravine two kilometers from the village. At noon we found our lunches frozen. "If we had had even bits of frozen food in the old days," Chen Yung-kuei

said to us young people, "we wouldn't have had to go begging." He talked about the history of his family and the village.

He said there were five "manys" in the old Tachai—many hired out to landlords or rich peasants, many who owed debts, many who had to beg, many forced to sell their children, many who committed suicide. His family of five had nothing to their name. Two hired out to landlords, three went begging. One particularly bad year the landlord they worked for pressed so hard for the debts they owed him that there was no way out but to sell mother, sister and brother. He and his father went on as hired laborers. When the father was too old to be useful anymore, the landlord kicked him out. He hanged himself. Chen Young-huei was left alone.

The sun was setting. Chen Young-huei told us girls, "Go home now and get some rest."

"No," we said, "if you older people can go on working, so can we."

We young men and women formed two shock teams and vied for the heaviest work—carrying stones and building walls. "Our boys have iron shoulders," the older people said, "but our girls are made of iron too." After that we were called the "Iron Girls" team.

We finished rebuilding our fields in a year and a half. Soon the new houses—the ones you see today—were also completed. They were much more spacious than the ones we had before.

The year following the big flood, 1964, we averaged 6 tons per hectare of grain. In the ten years since then, we have gone in more and more for scientific farming, gaining experience in selecting and breeding good strains, close planting, field management, protecting crops from pests and diseases and reforming our system of cultivation. We used to grow only one crop a year. Now we interplant low-yield and high-yield crops and reap two harvests a year. We have added wheat and rice to corn and millet.

Electricity came in 1965. With brigade accumulation funds, which had been increasing year by year, we bought machines for threshing, milling and grinding. This liberated a large part of our labor force, especially the women, who used to grind the 115 tons of grain we consumed every year by hand.

Most of the heavy transport has been taken over by vehicles and our aerial cables. We send up several thousand tons of manure to the fields every year. Transporting by cable hoppers saves us 10,000 workdays a year. We made our own explosives and since 1971 have blasted away 36 hilltops and leveled four ravines with a bulldozer to make large level fields which can be irrigated and cultivated by machines.

Our grain yield has long topped 7.5 tons per hectare, ten times more than before liberation. We have 60,000 fruit and timber trees. We have also multiplied our draught animals and pigs. We have an ample grain reserve. Our public accumulation fund is 800,000 yuan—about 10,000 yuan per household. Every family has its own reserve grain and savings in the bank, quite a few with deposits of one or two thousand yuan.

FARMING FOR THE REVOLUTION

Just before the birth of the People's Republic of China Chairman Mao pointed out that the education of the peasantry was a serious problem.

Collectivization has gradually done away with the system of private ownership of the means of agricultural production. But remnants of private-ownership thinking formed by several thousand years of individual peasant economy have yet to be wiped out.

Precisely because such a change cannot be brought about in one day, from the beginning of collectivization twenty years ago, the Tachai Party branch has helped its peasants to use Mao Tsetung Thought to develop the proletarian idea of farming for the revolution and love for the socialist state and the collective. This paves the way for a complete break with private-ownership ideas.

Chao Hsiao-ho is a good example of how this works. He herded sheep for a landlord before liberation and was sold to another landlord in another county. After liberation he came back to Tachai. The year the co-op became fully socialist, it sent Chao to the next county to buy two oxen. He returned with three. The third one, belonging to a neighboring co-op, had followed him home. Chen Yung-kuei told him to take the ox back, but he said, "I'm doing this for the collective, not for myself."

"Small-groupism is actually a form of narrow individualism," said Chen Yung-kuei. "Chairman Mao pointed this out for us long ago. We must not only care for our own collective but also other collectives."

When Tachai became a commune brigade, Chao Hsiao-ho became a cart-driver. Carrying construction materials back from the county town one day, he brought back an extra section of rolled steel. Chen Yung-kuei said he should take it back. "But the state will never miss such a small section of rolled steel," Chao argued.

"The state is a big socialist collective," said Chen. "We should care even more for this bigger collective." Chao took the steel section back.

The Party branch helped Chao Hsiao-ho study Chairman Mao's works, showing him what revolution meant. Chao was inspired by the lives of the revolutionaries praised by Chairman Mao—Chang Szu-teh who served the people wholeheartedly, and Norman Bethune, the Canadian doctor who gave his life for the Chinese revolution in a spirit of utter devotion to others without any thought of self. Trying conscientiously to become like them, Chao Hsiao-ho grew into a new-type peasant with a proletarian world outlook and utterly devoted to the public.

In 1972 we had the worst and longest drought in a hundred years. It lasted 17 months, way into the spring of 1973. Our corn simply had to be watered or it would be lost. We got word that we could bring water from the county reservoir through our canal. Chen Yung-kuei came to us and said, "The water in the reservoir is running low too. Shall we let the other brigades have it?"

We agreed. All the able-bodied men and women in our brigade went to get water from a well 2.5 kilometers away. With a shoulder pole, each could bring two buckets per trip, enough for just six plants. We needed 3,000 buckets—a total of 7,500 kilometers of walking—for every hectare. And there were 30 hectares. But we did it. Our 1973 harvest was the biggest in our history.


Every year in the last two decades we have not only fulfilled our quota of grain to the state but sold large amounts of surplus grain, too.

Through criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, Tachai's leaders and members became even more fully aware of the importance of continuing the revolution. We held meetings criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius during work breaks and in the evenings. Many families hold their own small meetings. Applying Chairman Mao's theories on class struggle, we saw why Lin Piao regarded Confucius' idea of restraining oneself and restoring the old order as a maxim. Though the two lived two thousand years apart, they were alike. Both made last-ditch efforts to prop up the declining exploiting classes they represented. Confucius wanted to restore the slave system for the slaveowning class. Lin Piao wanted to restore capitalism for the landlord and bourgeois classes.

"We can see Lin Piao and Confucius were two rotten melons on the same rotten vine," the members said. "Lin Piao tried to overthrow China's dictatorship of the proletariat so that landlords and capitalists could ride roughshod over us again. We'll fight anyone who tries to drag us back to the old ways!"

The criticism has made the Tachai brigade members more determined and more enthusiastic about building socialism. This year, as soon as the Spring Festival was over, we began a new battle to turn still another ravine into a level field

MAP OF TRIP: MAP OF CHENGDU AREA



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